

MAY 1996

\$4.95 in USA
\$5.95 in Canada

CURRENT HISTORY

A Journal of Contemporary World Affairs



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FOUNDED IN 1914

MAY 1996

VOL. 95, NO. 601

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EDITOR'S NOTE:

In his new book, *The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the Twenty-first Century*, Robert Kaplan—the political travelogist who gave us “The Coming Anarchy”—speculates that perhaps “the forest has made the war in Liberia” since “in the forest . . . men tend to depend less on reason and more on superstition.”

According to Will Reno's piece on Liberia in this issue, Kaplan has it half right; the forest has made the war in Liberia—not because it inspires superstition but because the sale of forest timber finances the Liberian warlords and their causes. And it is this explanation, not superstition, that can help make sense of the recent outburst of fighting in the Liberian capital. (Kaplan's views, however, undoubtedly set the Clinton administration's political perspective on Liberia that led to the evacuation of American citizens from the country because of the fighting and inspired major newspapers to see “anarchy” and “chaos” reigning with this outburst of fighting.) Irrationality, it would seem, is more easily ascribed to the postmodern thinking of authors like Kaplan, who make man hostage to forces he cannot control, than to the profit-minded, power-seeking actors who inhabit the Liberian jungle.

This issue examines several other dysfunctional African states, and we also look at an earlier form of political dysfunction, apartheid South Africa, and how that country's political culture and the whites who shaped it fare today. We end with a discussion of one of the world's remaining nonstates, Western Sahara, whose emergence as an independent entity has been left in abeyance by the international community.

COMMENTS ON THIS MONTH'S ISSUE?

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CURRENT HISTORY

May 1996

Vol. 95, No. 601

"Nigeria first entered. . . 'the dismal tunnel' on January 15, 1966, when the military overthrew all the institutions of a democratically elected government. . . If there is light at the end of [this] tunnel, it is imperceptible to anyone not paid to see it."

Nigeria: Inside the Dismal Tunnel

RICHARD JOSEPH

The November 10, 1995, execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other activists from the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People by the military government of General Sani Abacha quickly earned worldwide condemnation. It also led to greater international awareness of the regime's repressive policies and highlighted the fact that, although Nigerians have been governed longer by soldiers than by elected politicians since independence in October 1960, the legitimacy and efficacy of military rule have always been vigorously contested.

One month after the regime of General Yakubu Gowon was overthrown in a palace coup in July 1975, Obafemi Awolowo published a set of recommendations to the new rulers. Awolowo had been a civilian member of the Gowon government, but left once the Biafran war ended. Although it promised to return power to civilians in a measured manner, the Gowon government had begun implementing a vast number of far-reaching policies—a pattern that would be followed by all its military successors. Awolowo's admonitions are as relevant today as they were two decades ago: the military administration should serve as "an essentially corrective regime, and not a reconstructing

administration with ready and lasting answers to all our political and economic ills. . . It would be too much of a task for it to attempt the massive and neverending task of rebuilding or reconstructing the body politic."

This advice has never been heeded by Nigeria's military rulers. Although General Ibrahim Babangida spent eight futile years between 1985 and 1993 directing a large number of structural reforms, including a complicated transition to civilian rule, the Sani Abacha regime has unveiled a similar set of initiatives to justify remaining in power. Awolowo had his own motives in counseling the armed forces to limit its political agenda. However, in this and other matters, his comments went to the heart of the Nigerian dilemma.

Nigeria first entered what Awolowo labeled "the dismal tunnel" on January 15, 1966, when the military overthrew all the institutions of a democratically elected government. That date echoed in the decision of the constitutional conference, established by Abacha after he seized power on November 17, 1993, to set January 1996 as the date his regime would return power to elected civilians. It took considerable effort and persistence to obtain such a declaration from a conference packed with Abacha appointees and subject to all forms of inducements, co-optation, and coercion. But in April 1995 the conference reversed itself and left the termination date open. On October 1, 1995, Abacha demonstrated his dominance over all internal political forces and his disregard for international opinion by declaring that he would remain in power until 1998. The execution of the

RICHARD JOSEPH, a visiting professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has written extensively on Nigerian politics. His books include *Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). This article is based on a paper presented at a conference on the "Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria" at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, November 10-12, 1995.

Ogoni activists a month later was a clear signal that only extraordinary measures will loosen the military's grip on power.

Although Nigeria has seen the arrival of an entirely new generation of political, military, and civilian elites and has undergone several regime changes, purges, dismissals, and detentions of members of the political class, the criticisms of Major Kaduna Nzeogwu, who led the seizure of power in northern Nigeria in the January 1966 coup, are as pertinent today as they were 30 years ago. Nzeogwu identified Nigeria's main "enemies" as "the political profiteers, the swindlers, the men in high and low places. . . those who seek to keep the country divided permanently so that they can remain in office as ministers or VIPs at least; the tribalists, the nepotists, those who make the country look big for nothing before international circles, those who have corrupted our society and put the Nigerian political calendar back by their words and deeds."

There is little dispute about what Nigeria has become. The economy is in shambles, kept afloat only by the continued production and export of petroleum. All major public institutions are in a state of advanced decay; social services have deteriorated steadily for over a decade. Once described as kleptocratic, the conduct of public officials merits a stronger designation as the society has become increasingly criminalized. Nigeria is now a major transit point in international drug trafficking and in the laundering of illicit fortunes. Although it has been a major oil producer for over two decades, Nigeria is now included among the debt-distressed nations. Moreover, it lacks the governing capacity even to manage the effective servicing of its estimated international debt of \$37 billion.

Even more troubling, Nigeria has become a rogue state, and as such refuses to abide by prevailing international ethical and legal norms in the conduct of public affairs. There are many indications of this new status: suspension of Nigeria's membership by the Commonwealth of States; universal criticism of the continued detention of president-elect Moshood Abiola along with scores of journalists, lawyers, human rights monitors, and political activists; condemnation of the June 1995 secret trials and subsequent sentences imposed on accused coup plotters, including the former president, General Olusegun Obasanjo, and his former deputy, General Shehu Yar'Adua; decertification by the United States government because of drug trafficking (which excludes Nigeria from most forms

of assistance); designation, together with Burma, as one of the worst human rights abusers in the United States State Department March 1996 annual report; cancellation of sporting events, including an international soccer tournament scheduled to take place in Nigeria in 1995; tight restrictions on the issuance of visas to Nigerian public officials and their families seeking visas to visit Western nations; and suspension of new loans and investments by multilateral agencies.

Although Nigeria's status has fallen internationally, it is still being given every chance to "return to the fold" before more drastic measures are imposed, such as a ban on arms sales and purchases of Nigerian crude oil. Even the Commonwealth chose to suspend Nigeria for two years rather than expel it after the November 1995 executions.

How did this state of affairs come to pass? Why has Nigeria, which has conducted perhaps the most extensive attempts of any developing nation to construct a constitutional democracy, failed so abysmally? Why has the Nigerian military, after governing the country during much of the post-civil war decade in a manner that permitted a wide degree of openness and autonomy in civil society, produced one of the few regimes on the continent still characterized today as "authoritarian"? How did a country that had a deserved reputation as a principled leader of the continent on international matters, especially the struggle against the racist regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa, come to be described by a British foreign minister as a place of "growing cruelty"?

THE PREBENDAL REPUBLIC

The current crisis in Nigeria can be seen as the outcome of a number of forces whose interactions have pushed the nation down a particular path. One of the elements that should not be overlooked is the repeated failure of civilian politics. As General T. Danjuma, the chief of the army staff under Obasanjo, pointed out with some exasperation in the 1970s, "It is now fashionable in Nigeria to talk about a military regime being an aberration, and that a return to civilian rule means a return to democracy. This is a fallacy because we never had a democracy in Nigeria."

A critical moment came in 1979, following a careful attempt to lay the basis for a stable democracy, that masked a deep flaw that would undermine the new system. That flaw was the relationship between the administration of public

office and the acquisition and distribution of material benefits. These practices had also become central to the processes of party building and the making of political alliances. The party that won power in the elections did so for a number of reasons, including its willingness to capitalize on this logic. These well-established practices in Nigerian sociopolitical life can yield short-term gains but also contribute to the sapping of the authority, legitimacy, capacity, and finances of the state.

According to the theory of prebendalism, state offices are regarded as prebends that can be appropriated by officeholders, who use them to generate material benefits for themselves and their constituents and kin groups. In Nigeria, the statutory purposes of such offices became a matter of secondary concern. With the National Party of Nigeria (NPN)—which regarded itself as Nigeria's natural party of government—leading the way in entrenching these practices at the federal level, and all other parties doing likewise in the state and local governments they controlled, Nigeria during the Second Republic between 1979 and 1983, evolved into a full-fledged “prebendal republic.”¹ The state was a national cake to be divided and subdivided among officeholders. Politics degenerated, as the scholar Claude Ake has pointed out, into an unrelenting war to acquire, defend, or gain access to state offices.

Although civilians had fashioned this system while Nigeria was under colonial rule, the Nigerian military contributed to its extension. There was little difference between the final years of the Gowon administration and those of the Second Republic in this regard. In fact, the members of every Nigerian government, from the regional administrations under colonial rule in the 1950s to the Abacha regime, have demonstrated an increasing propensity to divert public funds for their personal use. Justice Akinola Aguda stated it quite simply when he remarked in the late 1970s that the one achievement of every Nigerian government is that it has created more millionaires than its predecessor. Today, with the emergence of “pharaonic” in place of the milder “prebendal” corruption, that comment should be amended to “multimillionaires.”

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BABANGIDA'S BOGUS TRANSITION

Despite these failings, Nigeria has usually remained a place of hope. It was, and still is, the greatest agglomeration of African peoples within the boundaries of a single nation-state, and it still possesses considerable natural resources. Nevertheless, in 1989 there came a moment when it became evident that the country was lost in the “dismal tunnel.” General Babangida, having already postponed the promised date for the hand-over of power to civilians from 1990 to 1992, allowed political associations being formed to seek registration as political parties. However, the requirements were grossly unreasonable. The number of offices that associations had to open, the lists and photographs of supporters that had to be provided, and the timetable imposed on them—everything had to be done in a matter of only a few months. The regime set the rules and it could impose any criteria it wished.

After the mountains of materials were delivered to the Electoral Commission in Lagos, the verdict soon followed: none of the associations had met the test and the government would create its own political parties, name them, write their manifestos, and oversee their development. The military regime had embarked on what Awolowo and others had long cautioned against as “the massive and neverending task of rebuilding or reconstructing the body politic”; it was assuming full responsibility for establishing the instruments by which Nigerian civil society would be allowed to pursue its political and social objectives. Little wonder that Nigerian critics dismissed the new parties as parastatals (state-financed enterprises).

As was revealed to participants in an August 1990 conference, the two-party system imposed by the Babangida regime after it dismissed all political associations in 1989 was a preconceived plan. All the political aspirants and entrepreneurs who took part in these exercises have been dupes to one extent or another, since the regime had no intention of ceding power. The transition to democracy became a game in which the rules were changed as soon as the civilian politicians felt they had mastered them. In the hope of inheriting power, or some parcel of it, many Nigerians—soldiers, trade unionists, established politicians, traditional rulers, intellectuals, businesspersons—had been led by Babangida further into the dismal tunnel.

In the election of June 12, 1993, Babangida

¹The first independent civilian government, between 1960 and 1966, is often referred to as the First Republic. The Third Republic, constructed under Babangida, was stillborn.

finally allowed two affluent businessmen—who considered themselves his cronies—to contest the presidency. They were only the last of the many individuals who had been led to believe that Babangida supported their candidacies only to find themselves dismissed as they reached for the brass ring. On the very eve of his June 23 annulment of the elections, some of Babangida's advisers left a meeting with him reassured that the next day he would announce the winner and next president of the nation.

After 1989 it seemed that there was little new to be said about Nigerian politics. The prebendal character of the state and political life generally had been repeatedly confirmed. Rather than changing what had become fundamental to Nigerian political life, the major developments under the Babangida regime—the considerable growth of the powers of the presidency, Babangida's domination over all aspects of political and social life, the colossal sums privately appropriated (especially by senior members of the regime), the minute stage managing of an elusive transition process—only deepened the contradictions that had been identified by many analysts.

Throughout this period, concerned Nigerians were unable to arouse awareness of the direction Babangida was leading Nigeria as long as the regime repeated its promise to transfer power to an elected government. Following a byzantine series of developments, Babangida was induced by the military hierarchy to leave office on August 26, 1993, clearing the way for Sani Abacha to brush aside Ernest Shonekan's "Interim Civilian Government" less than three months later. Abacha, a man Obasanjo has described as Babangida's "eminent disciple, faithful supporter, and beneficiary," proceeded to take the nation deeper into the dismal tunnel after seizing power on November 17, 1993.

THE MILITARY-CIVILIAN REVOLVING DOOR

Although Awolowo claimed that military rule was an abnormality in Nigeria, it is also the case that civilian rule has not left a commendable record. The violence and mayhem, especially in western Nigeria at the time of the 1983 elections, were reminiscent of the carnage and confusion during the final years of the First Republic. The corrupt behavior of public officials and the gross mismanagement and increasing repressiveness of the federal and state governments during the Shehu Shagari era raised fears that Nigeria would experience a severe crisis if it continued to be inef-

ficiently and corruptly governed while becoming increasingly impoverished. When the armed forces stepped in on December 31, 1983, the ease of their takeover reflected the extent to which the civilian government had lost legitimacy in the eyes of the demoralized and anxious population. Even the embryonic Third Republic, in the form of elected governments at the local, state, and federal levels under Babangida, showed signs of continuing this pattern. As Obasanjo has noted, "In very few states were cases of corruption and obscene malpractice and abuse of office not the order of the day. At the national level, the scale of corruption was monumental."

But Nigeria has also known peace, some economic progress, and a sense of hopefulness during certain periods of military rule. This was the case during the first years following the Biafran war, for much of the Murtala Muhammed-Obasanjo regime, between 1975 and 1979, and for the early years of the Babangida administration. During each of these episodes a distinctly Nigerian military system of governance was in evidence. This system, beginning with Gowon, was refined by each subsequent military administration. In both federal and state governments, a relatively small group of military officers were assisted by civilian appointees, who included well-known politicians as well as private citizens from the professions and the business world. The effective sharing of power took place between the higher military and civil bureaucracies.

This system allowed considerable freedom and autonomy within civil society. Indeed, Nigeria had a freer press during these episodes and a more active, autonomous, and effective array of interest and professional groups than most African countries. Moreover, the balancing of representation of Nigeria's major ethnic groups in the government and in the major public institutions was also handled reasonably well by this system.

Each military government, however, was subject to decay because the military was an unaccountable body that could not restrain the inevitable abuses of office and, except for the Obasanjo regime, was unable to arrange a smooth succession. It thereby increasingly invited counter-coups. When Sani Abacha seized power in November 1993, even he temporarily aroused hopes that this known system of governance would be reinstalled. Although Abacha dismissed all the elective political institutions, he managed to draw into his government an impressive group of

national politicians, including the long-time human rights lawyer Olu Onagoruwa, who became his minister of justice. By this time, however, such gestures no longer had any substantive meaning; they were merely rituals aimed at obtaining compliance with continued military rule.

When Babangida came to power in August 1985, it seemed that Nigeria was returning to the familiar conciliar system of governance. As Babangida stated in criticizing his predecessors, "A diverse polity like Nigeria required recognition and the appreciation of differences in both cultural and individual perceptions." In fact, the first year of Babangida's rule, characterized by his wide degree of consultation and an open style, kept at bay criticisms of his self-described "military democracy."

By the end of his eight years in power, what the country had experienced, in the words of one of its erstwhile agents, was "organized confusion." Babangida's government claimed to be laying the basis for a "stable liberal democracy" and in its early years pushed through reforms intended to create the foundation for a more market-oriented economy. The Political Bureau appointed by Babangida shortly after he came to power recommended the construction of a socialist republic, a goal the regime rejected while accepting the need for extensive social and ethical mobilization of the population and the creation of a costly bureaucracy to fulfill that role. It initially adopted the conciliar mode of interest accommodation, but gradually supplanted it with a corporatist propensity to charter new institutions and make formerly autonomous bodies dependent on presidential largesse. And after promoting a vigorous human rights policy, it moved to harassing and imprisoning the country's leading human rights lawyers and activists, detaining journalists and banning publications.

ANOTHER REPLAY?

At the end of the 1980s the Campaign for Democracy and its affiliates had called for a national conference to lay the basis for a genuine transition process in place of Babangida's manipulations. In the neighboring francophone countries of Benin, Congo, and Niger, this approach had brought an end to military regimes, but it had been stoutly resisted or derailed in others, such as Cameroon and Zaire. Nigeria needed a new basis

for civilian politics that would emerge from an "ingathering" of all political and social forces rather than a renewed top-down crafting by a military regime.

In addition to the need for a transitional process that would mobilize the broad forces of Nigerian society, another issue needed to be addressed: that these transitions were largely phases in the circulation of powerful elites. Since civilians have held government posts under military as well as civilian regimes, they have tended to become involved in promoting changes within military systems, or even military coups (as in 1983 and 1993), that benefit their own material interests.

The idea of a period of nonpartisan civilian government as a kind of "probationary" exercise has regularly surfaced in Nigerian political discourse.

One flaw in the transition to the Second Republic was the absence of such an experience at the national level. Indeed, three of the regime's four years in power were devoted to the making of the constitution and only one year to legalized party building, campaigning, and elections.

What was required was a bridge between the system of governance established by the military and the reestablishment of a fully open system of competitive party politics. Such a "bridge" was also advocated in 1975 by Awolowo, who suggested that Nigeria should not move directly to a winner-take-all system. He therefore revived a recommendation put forward earlier by Aminu Kano, a populist opposition leader, that any "political probationary period" should last five years, during which a sharing of all government positions would be proportional to the votes won by parties in the elections—a proposal remarkably similar to the transitional arrangements put into effect in South Africa two decades later. Such an idea, if adopted in Nigeria, should not be introduced as another superficial exercise in political engineering but should be anchored to a broader institutional process, such as a national conference or its equivalent.

The Abacha regime has unveiled a new draft constitution whose most striking feature is the introduction of a rotational presidency in which the position of head of state will revolve among the country's major ethnolinguistic groups. And on October 1, 1995, Abacha announced a new three-year "transition program." Already, Nigerian polit-

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ical aspirants have begun creating political associations, anticipating the starting pistol for the formation of political parties and renewed competition for electoral office. But as long as a Nigerian military regime maintains effective control of the security forces, it can dictate any "transition" program it wants with the knowledge that politically ambitious Nigerians will dance to the new tune. Despite the country's economic shambles, oil production continues and there will always be major fortunes to be made by holding state office.

What, therefore, are Nigeria's options three years after the Babangida regime was forced out? The most likely is another replay of the Babangida scenario: a supposedly democratizing regime that uses its leverage to keep revising the "transition program," thereby prolonging its stay in power until it is forced out. A second option is a different transition program based on a national conference or power-sharing framework, as suggested earlier. This option would depend on the termination of Sani Abacha's rule and its replacement by a military regime committed to a genuine transition. A third option was taking shape within the Babangida "transition" and was blocked by a preemptive military coup by Babangida himself against an incipient "citizens' republic" when he canceled the elections of June 12, 1993.

A fourth option has always been rumored within the country but has never been carried out—a radical military coup comparable to the second seizure of power by Jerry Rawlings in Ghana in 1981, with the intention of establishing a revolutionary government and sidelining the established military and civilian political class. Although junior officers have often played a significant role in coups in Nigeria, once successful, they have usually ceded place to more senior officers. The threat of the dire actions the "Young Turks" would unleash once in power has often been used to justify a preemptive move by more conservative senior officers. The bloodbath at the time of the attempted overthrow of the Babangida regime in April 1990 is an indication of the carnage that would ensue if a military faction tried to seize power without having firm control of core units of the army.

DEMOCRACY DEFERRED

Pini Jason, a Nigerian journalist, contends that "General Babangida annulled Nigeria's best chance

to enter the 21st century as a modern democracy." Something unusual did take place in Nigeria on June 12, 1993, and the report by Peter Lewis, who was present for the occasion, is instructive. He notes that the party-building process up to the presidential elections had replicated the misconduct normally associated with civilian politics in Nigeria; "aspiring political factions employed fraud, financial inducement, and violence in the bid for advantage."² It seemed that hardly a week went by when one party official or another was not suspending a colleague, or defecting to the opposition. In 1992 the regime had canceled the presidential primaries on the basis of alleged irregularities and substituted an even more complicated system. When the day of the presidential elections arrived in 1993, however, Nigerians performed a collective and national act that made these elections one of the most peaceful to take place in Africa during the current wave of democratic transitions.

Lewis's report confirms one issued by the Nigerian Center for Democratic Studies, which had organized its own election-monitoring exercise. The election campaign was conducted with "unprecedented decorum; [it] was marked by little of the political violence and electoral manipulation of the past; there was limited evidence of fraud and vote-rigging; polling was generally conducted in a peaceful and orderly manner" and the results were promptly collated by the [National Electoral Commission]."

Any observer of previous Nigerian elections—even the Babangida "transition"—is likely to blink on reading these words. Something very remarkable had happened in Nigeria. The unannounced results of the election, which would have shown a 58 percent majority for Moshood Abiola, were also noteworthy both for the size of his plurality and for the fact that he drew significant support from all areas of the country, including several major northern precincts.

The deliberately contrived judicial pronouncements canceling the elections, then blocking the announcement of the returns, and the bizarre exertions of Arthur Nzeribe's Association for Better Nigeria to get the government to scuttle the entire process, reflect the panic within government circles and among some of its constituencies that, despite all the roadblocks and "organized confusion," the Nigerian people were going to elect a president who could not be relied on, once in office, to do the bidding of the outgoing regime.

²"Endgame in Nigeria: The Politics of a Failed Democratic Transition," *African Affairs*, vol. 93 (1994), p. 324.

Moshood Abiola is no paragon of democratic accountability; he has become fabulously wealthy by mastering the strategies for acquiring power and wealth in Nigerian society. However, only someone with his wide networks of political and business associates could have reached the end-point in Babangida's "transition." But the Nigerian electorate was voting for much more than a man. After all the delays, it had been granted one final chance to get the military out of power and restart the Nigerian "political calendar"—and it made the most of it. As Lewis points out, "the combined influences of apathy, apprehension and confusion kept many away from the polls." The resulting 35 percent turnout was subsequently used by the regime's supporters in its campaign to weaken Abiola's claims. In view of all that Nigerians had experienced since the "transition" began eight years earlier, it is remarkable that so many were still prepared to go to the polls.

June 12, 1993, should not be seen in isolation. The argument can be made that it represents one of several elements of a citizens' republic whose emergence has been stymied by the misconduct of civilian politicians as well as the deliberate interference of a politicized military. Thus, during the First Republic a political system with two broad political groupings evolved. A similar process was in evidence during the Second Republic. Both trends were halted by the irresponsible behavior of the political class and the military's arrogation of the absolute right to rule. Rather than the military rushing in to "save" the Nigerian nation, it is Nigerian civilian politicians who will have to experience, and surmount, the deepest challenges to the nation, whether they take the form of economic difficulties, internal discord, or external threats to the nation's security.

Chief Adisa Akinloye, a leading politician in the National Party of Nigeria during the Second Republic, made the observation that "there are really two parties in Nigeria: the military and the civilians." Only the latter can still give rise to a sustainable democracy in Nigeria. When Babangida rounded up a number of politicians and detained them for violating the ban on political activities in 1991, another remarkable event occurred that presaged what took place in June 1993. Although these politicians came from different parts of the country and belonged to different political formations, they discovered that they

shared much common ground. When they were released they put forward a set of common positions on the political process, much to the chagrin of the Babangida administration. This is an indication of the kind of experience that a national conference or its equivalent could force Nigeria's senior politicians to undergo, similar to the transition proceedings in South Africa. It could also lead to the fashioning of a common political program, together with a commitment to overcome the country's regional, ethnic, and religious divisions and make possible the national concord that could sustain an extended period of civilian rule.

BEYOND THE ROGUE STATE

It is in the behavior of the ruthless security services, which proliferated under the Babangida regime, that the embryonic rogue state may be discerned. When the dynamic journalist and publisher Dele Giwa was blown apart in October 1986 by a parcel bomb while he was investigating the connections between the criminal and military networks, a signal was sent of what could be in store for other Nigerians who threatened the consolidation of mafia-style governance. With each reshuffling of Nigerian military rulers, the risk of an unbridled tyranny grew. As a private citizen commented with chilling prescience just before Babangida stepped down:

"Unless we say never again, we will wake up one day and a psychopath in uniform will usurp authority, use and abuse power to plunder the nation, and dare us speak."

Less than a year after he had handed power to civilians, General Obasanjo took part in a debate with a law lecturer on the campus of the University of Ibadan. That confrontation can now be seen as having taken place across the fault line in the construction of the Nigerian polity. Rejecting the argument that the Nigerian military undermined the rule of law, Obasanjo contended that the military invoked an alternate and equally authoritative legal system whenever it dismissed civilians and suspended the constitution. As a consequence, he argued, the "ability, competence, and authority" of the Nigerian military "to make law that is valid and binding on all citizens should not be in doubt or questioned once they are effectively in political power." He also extended such authority to include the right to disregard not just constitu-

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tyranny grew.*

tional procedures but such fundamental principles as the inadmissibility of retroactive laws; "when occasions do call for such laws to save the nation from political or economic destruction, the governing majority must be able to act in defense of the nation."

Fifteen years later Obasanjo has been arrested, tried, and imprisoned on the basis of the very alternate "legal system" he once defended. A spokesperson for the Abacha regime brushed off criticisms of the 1995 secret trials by arguing that "this is not the first time we have had this type of trial" in Nigeria, and wondered why "past secret coup trials in Nigeria did not attract this kind of attention." In the kafkaesque world that Nigeria has become since the Babangida era, Emeka Ojukwu, who led an armed struggle against the Nigerian nation between 1967 and 1970, can rebuke Olusegun Obasanjo, who defended the nation in that civil war: "If there is any punishment that comes, should he be found guilty of whatever it is, it will be prescribed by no other person than himself."

As any passing knowledge of the speeches and writings of Obasanjo would indicate, the former military ruler has come a long way from his defense of the military's right to disregard fundamental rules of jurisprudence in "the defense of the nation." When the Abacha regime declared in 1994 that it was suspending habeas corpus, and when it detains lawyers who try to defend their clients, what exists is no longer a "militarized Leviathan" that seeks to preserve organized society but a rogue state whose motivations cannot be predicted, and whose boundaries for irrational behavior are unknown.

In exiting this tunnel, Nigeria cannot just go back to the "good old days" of the prebendal republic, whether in its military or civilian form. It must go further back to a citizens' republic. This republic can only be brought into being incrementally and through an extended period of accom-

modation and power-sharing among civilian groups in an open and accountable national unity government.

The June 1993 elections demonstrated that the Nigerian people may be ready for such an exercise. In 1975 they believed that Murtala Muhammad would create such an opportunity; in 1985 and 1986, Ibrahim Babangida sparked similar hopes. In the various regions of Nigeria other civilian politicians have also emerged from time to time to rekindle that vision. But the solemn fact is that, by the end of this century, Nigerians will have experienced nearly 50 years of political experimentation, beginning with the formation of the first major political parties around 1950, followed by elected regional administrations. These experiments, many inspired by the finest democratic ideals, have resulted in a ravaged economy, a poorly functioning state, and recurrent social upheavals.

The Abacha regime has shown little sign of veering from its determination to undertake its own reconstruction of the body politic. Commissions have been established to supervise a new "transition," to oversee elections from the local to the national level, and to review the number and composition of states and local governments. In the meantime, sporadic bombings and attacks on individuals continue, as well as arrests and harassment of political opponents.

The United States government is calling for increasing international sanctions on Nigeria, but the discovery of new oil deposits and major foreign investments in natural gas production are enhancing the leverage of the regime. Despite an aggressive public relations campaign, the transition program lacks international legitimacy. Nevertheless, a new set of Nigerian politicians, and some old ones, will be induced to take part as long as there is hope of reaching the political trough that the state now exclusively represents. If there is light at the end of the dismal tunnel, it is imperceptible to anyone not paid to see it. ■

"The Pentagon is now dancing in the ruins of Yugoslavia, and Somalia has slipped back into its pre-intervention stateless state. There is almost no evidence that the United States and UN were ever there, little trace of the \$4 billion that was spent. . . in a global operation to settle what was at its core the politics of dysfunctional families."

Somalia: Whose Failure?

MICHAEL MAREN

Sadness permeated the UN's departure from Somalia in March 1995, as if it were the premature closing of an underappreciated Broadway show. The giant operation collapsed into itself. UN personnel retreated from their 80-acre compound in Mogadishu to the seaside port-airport complex, and finally to the port alone. Holes were dug in the sand and perfectly good vehicles were buried—just to keep them from looters. UN workers packed their bags and tore down the prefab houses they had erected along the beach. Pakistani and Egyptian soldiers combed their hair, shaved, and waited for the ships and planes that would take them away.

With every departing charter flight the compound became a bit quieter and a lot emptier. The French-run PX, which formerly echoed with the happy sounds of UN employees buying party-size crates of beer, whiskey, and cigarettes, became a dormitory for the last UNICEF workers. Then buildings were abandoned, and the last foreigners moved into empty shipping containers. Somali staff lined up to collect their final paychecks and demand additional compensation for working overtime and holidays. The UN slowly backed away, covering its retreat with disbursements of over a million dollars a day to keep things quiet. Every night fewer and fewer people were pressed into tighter and tighter quarters until the whole operation vanished into a dot on the horizon.

Above and beyond it all were the Americans, who had returned to cover the UN's retreat just a year after their own unceremonious withdrawal. This time the Americans were there to rescue and

protect. They were the cavalry rushing in as saviors, their uniforms unsoiled by their own now distant involvement in Somalia. This time the failure was all the UN's.

The Americans talked about how the UN mandate in Somalia had been overambitious, how a "purely" humanitarian intervention had somehow become "nation building," and how that was never meant to be. Somehow the UN had gotten out of control. It was UN Security Council Resolution 814, which used terms like "political settlement" and "transitional government institutions," that had stretched this far beyond its original intent.

Most UN officers were too diplomatic to point out that Resolution 814 had been written in Washington by General Colin Powell's staff, and rammed through the Security Council in March 1993 by the Americans, who then left Pakistani, Malaysian, Bangladeshi, Indian, Zimbabwean, and Nigerian troops to do what their own marines had decided was unfeasible.

It seemed that failure had been written into the contract.

RUNNING TO STAND STILL

As the plug was being pulled, it was hard not to think of the way things had once been. The air was constantly filled with helicopters shuttling people around, as if Mogadishu were some futuristic model city. Passengers and freight moved through an efficient transport web that covered the entire country. A satellite communications system made remote UN outposts easy-to-reach extensions of a New York City telephone exchange. Thirty thousand soldiers and several thousand civilians were supplied with food and water from abroad. Dignitaries came and went. Aid workers with radios attached to their belts attended security meetings every morning.

MICHAEL MAREN's book on Somalia and foreign aid, *A Multitude of Sins*, will be published this fall by the Free Press.

This was largely the accomplishment of UN special representative Admiral Jonathan Howe. The man destined to be remembered for his ill-fated hunt for General Mohammed Farah Aidid had wrested a vast functioning bureaucracy where once there was chaos and desert. And it all ran beautifully.

From the Somalis' perspective, however, the entire bureaucracy was an object of endless amusement. They saw foreigners darting about the streets of Mogadishu, risking their lives, occasionally getting killed or kidnapped, going from meeting to meeting, always busy, always going in and out of offices, always in a hurry, yet seemingly doing nothing. Nothing was ever built in Mogadishu except what the Somalis built for themselves. The only thing the foreigners left behind was military debris and trash; vast fields of empty plastic water bottles that poor Somalis first hoarded but soon had their fill of. The UN paid Somali contractors to cart off the refuse, but then showed little interest in what was actually done with the waste once it left the confines of the UN's compounds. Other than this, the entire UN operation seemed totally isolated from Somalia, as if it were under a plastic dome.

The United States military ended up adopting the Somali view of the bureaucracy. American officers described the operation as a "self-licking ice cream cone."

George Bennett, the UN's spokesman—and one of a handful of people who had been with United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) from the beginning—gamely continued in the last days to put a positive spin on the situation. But Bennett was tired, and his spinning lacked its usual energy and conviction. As with everyone else, his disappointment was tempered with relief: after many close calls and last minute reprieves, UNOSOM was finally over. Bennett had represented three different UN special representatives in Somalia. One, Howe, had tried to kill Aidid, and the most recent, Victor Gbeho, had, in Bennett's words, been seduced by Aidid.

Bennett sat in his office, now stuck inside of a hangar on the airfield, smoking cigarettes and trying to speak over the roar of jet engines and diesel trucks. I suggested to him that the entire operation might have been unnecessary or, at the very least, overly ambitious. Perhaps the UN could have saved the billions of dollars it had spent on building its own infrastructure and instead employed one person and a couple of assistants

to sit in Mogadishu and offer to mediate whenever the warlords were in the mood to talk to each other.

Bennett sat silently for a moment and then responded with a Somali proverb: "If you sweep the earth with a broom, it is the broom that wears out."

THE DOABLE'S UNDOING

The UN's peacemaking machine was cursed with a built-in flaw: it desperately needed to succeed. When the only way to bring peace to Somalia might have been to walk away, the bureaucracy was compelled to stay and find a peace for which it could take credit. The future of peacekeeping and peacemaking around the world depended on it. Indeed, of all the conflicts in the world Somalia was chosen because it was deemed, in the words of General Powell, "doable." The fight there was regarded as petty compared to, say, "the ancient animosities" that were inflaming passions in Bosnia.

In fact, it was the petty nature of the Somalia dispute—small men lusting after power and loot—that made the conflict so intractable. There were no issues. No ideological differences. Nothing to negotiate. As the UN stayed in Somalia it continued to supply the raw material of the conflict: loot. Each desperate move to get an agreement—any agreement—sapped the UN of credibility and respect. The UN paid massive hotel bills, flew warlords and their entourages to Addis Ababa, Nairobi, and Djibouti, and literally begged them to put their signatures on documents. Mohammed Ali Mahdi and Aidid used these meetings not to make peace with each other but as political conventions, where they lobbied and coerced other faction leaders, trying to convince them to sign on to a winning ticket. UN negotiators seemed first to favor Ali Mahdi, then Aidid, then Ali Mahdi again. Neither Aidid nor Ali Mahdi ended up with any respect for the institution.

Most Somalis could not understand why the UN was trying to scrape together a "democratic" government out of the remnants of the hated Mohammed Siad Barre regime. Both camps were largely staffed by people who had worked for Barre's dictatorship—including Aidid himself and Ali Mahdi's wife and closest advisers. In its desire to bring order to Somalia the UN would have happily reinstalled a dictatorship. Success for the UN would have been failure for Somalia.

But these details were of little interest to UN negotiators, who had no patience for the minutiae

of Somali politics. For both the UN and the United States, Somalia had long ago stopped being about Somalia. Somalia was about redeeming a faltering American foreign policy and carving out a brave new world of peacekeeping. The more the UN and the United States strained to reach an agreement, the farther away it seemed to drift. The few people within the bureaucracies who were conversant with the important details of Somalia's clan system resigned, complaining that no one was listening.

Those details, of interest only to the true Somaliphiles, were extremely important. For example, most people understood that Aidid and Ali Mahdi were members of the same clan family, the Hawiye, but came from different subclans, the Habar Gidir and Abgaal. Fewer realized that both subclans were broken down into further subclans that did not entirely support the faction leaders. Ali Mahdi's Abgaal-Harti was a minority that needed to keep the other subclans happy. And Aidid's Habar Gidir-Saad was dependent on the Habar Gidir-Ayr and Habar Gidir-Suleymaan for its infantry strength. And few were remotely aware that Aidid's even more immediate clan, the Habar Gidir-Saad-Jalaf, was involved in tense negotiations with the Habar Gidir-Saad-Hilolwe, the group that supplied most of Aidid's money and top advisers.

By the time the United States Marines came ashore in December 1992, Aidid and Ali Mahdi had fought each other to a bloody standstill. As early as March 1992, their factions had begun to turn inward, challenging their leadership. Photo ops with American diplomats were just what were needed to raise their profiles within their own clans.

From that point onward, almost everything Aidid did was an attempt to keep his own alliance intact. While the UN was exerting its energy to broker an agreement between the warlords, Aidid and Ali Mahdi were worried about keeping their relatives happy. In other words, billions of dollars and several hundred thousand foreign nationals were involved in a global operation to settle what was at its core the politics of dysfunctional families.

THE MAN WHO KNEW TOO LITTLE

The man who perhaps understood the least was the one who had taken on the largest burden: United States Ambassador Robert Oakley.

Oakley was reputedly "the one American who really knew what was going on." He had the useful skill of projecting an enigmatic semismile when-

ever confronted with questions that he did not want to or, more likely, could not answer. Most of the assembled press corps interpreted this as a sign of higher knowledge. The few with more experience in Somalia figured he didn't know what he was talking about. One incident stands out.

The day that Aidid was taken off the UN's most-wanted list in November 1993—one month after the disastrous October 3 United States Ranger raid that killed 18 Americans and hundreds of Somalis—Oakley went to see him. As he drove back through the streets of Mogadishu with an Aidid-supplied military escort, Oakley's convoy found itself in the middle of a cheering throng of Aidid supporters, who began chanting "Oakley, Oakley, Oakley." The ambassador wisely did not yield to the temptation to address the jubilant crowd. When I asked about it later, he pretended that it was all part of the plan.

"I've seen crowds here before. When they have on their smiling faces it's good," Oakley said.

"When they have on their nasty face it's bad, but I wasn't the least bit nervous." One of Oakley's assistants provided a bit more detail: "They led us on. . . We had no idea. We came down this street and there's this huge crowd. . . and I thought 'Gee, this looks interesting.'"

The truth, as usual, was that Oakley was being manipulated by Aidid. The ambassador had been driven into a massive pro-Aidid rally on the day Aidid made his triumphant return to public life. Oakley's presence at the meeting, even though he stayed in the car, was a public relations coup for Aidid.¹

Several times over the last two years, Aidid's clan was close to running Aidid out of town. Each time he was rescued, inadvertently, by the United States. Aidid deftly learned that he could unite his forces only by focusing on a common enemy; a call to arms against infidels and imperialists still gets adrenaline pumping in that part of Africa. The best way to isolate Aidid would have been to ignore him, not to put a \$25,000 price on his head or send in the Rangers. Each bloody confrontation with peacekeepers raised his profile. Likewise, every time Aidid was flown to a meeting or visited by Oakley, he walked away strengthened.

Neither the Americans nor the UN ever seemed to get a firm grasp of the clan system. The walls of their offices were plastered with clan diagrams torn from academic books. Starting with Samal, the supposed founder of the Somali people, the

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diagrams broke the system down into clan families, subclans, sub-subclans. It was all very neat and very graphic. But the Westerners tended to look at the family trees as if they were corporate organizational charts. They therefore concluded that power emanated from the top, and that everyone was really part of one big family. The fighting was internecine and therefore senseless.

What they never seemed to understand was that the Somalis themselves never thought in terms of organizational charts. Their perspective on their own lives was from the bottom up. Starting with immediate family and climbing up the family tree, the farther away you got, the more remote the connection. The loyalty of the foot soldiers to the chief at the top of the clan lasted only as long as the spoils of war came down through the ranks. Aidid needed to deliver the goods. The resources dumped by the military, the UN, the nongovernmental organizations, and the journalists ensured that Aidid had enough to spread around.

The battles fought in Mogadishu were for scarce resources, real wealth. The stakes were high. It was a battle for survival, far from senseless. To the contrary, it made perfect sense. For the last 10 years of the Barre government, relief food poured through the docks of Mogadishu. The government used that food to build its powerbase and control people in the hinterlands. Individuals used the food to get rich. It made perfect sense that the warlords would fight over relief food. Food was power and survival for the family.

For this reason the impending departure of UNOSOM was an immediate threat to Aidid's power, and the announcement that American marines would return to assist in the withdrawal was a final opportunity for Aidid to raise the banner of glorious combat.

In the months before the UNOSOM withdrawal, Aidid's power had been seriously challenged from within his own clan and from his external allies. His closest adviser and primary financier, Osman 'Ato', and his most powerful military ally, Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf, had been talking with members of Ali Mahdi's faction and were united in their conviction that Aidid had become power mad and was the main obstacle to peace in Somalia. Ato had gone to the Saad clan elders and gotten their agreement on this idea.

Aidid responded by playing his anti-American card once again. Through his radio station he told Somalis that the Americans were coming to "recol-

onize" Somalia. Most Somalis saw this for what it was: a desperate gambit by a desperate man. But Aidid's core supporters in his subclan rallied round. They attended twice-weekly demonstrations (as they had during the days of Aidid's battle against the UN) and spread the word. In the coastal town of Merka, one week before the Americans were to land, a group of elders asked me to explain why the Americans wanted to take over Somalia. I tried to assure them that the Americans would be there for two days, three at the most. They remained skeptical.

WRONG AGAIN

Just before the Somalia landing the Pentagon unveiled an array of high-tech, nonlethal weapons that it had in its arsenal. These included carpets that would release CS gas if trod on, and sticky-goop, which would disable an onrushing crowd by engulfing people in a mountain of glue, binding them to themselves, other people, and the ground. President Bill Clinton had reportedly been upset by the number of civilian casualties involved in a series of American operations in Somalia, starting with the deaths of at least 100 bystanders, many of them women and children, in a September 9, 1993, fire-fight. But his most immediate concern was with the Republicans and avoiding anything that might recall the disastrous October 3 attempt to capture Aidid. The plan was to keep it low key and nonviolent. The announcement of these nonlethal capabilities was designed to let potential looters and troublemakers know that the United States was prepared to deal with them. The message to Somalis was, STAY AWAY.

The Somalis didn't get it. For a week before the arrival of the marines the streets of Mogadishu were abuzz with rumors about the fantastic comic book, science-fiction gadgets the Americans were bringing with them. People planned to go to the gates of the port and airport just to see the stuff. What the hell? It couldn't kill you.

Once again, the Americans had completely misread the situation on the ground in Mogadishu. Their humane gesture was interpreted as a sign of weakness and an invitation. Privately, American commanders were concerned about just that. "Once the bad guys figure out we're not going to kill them they become more dangerous and endanger the force on the ground," one military planner noted.

But the Pentagon's eye wasn't exactly on the ball. The United States military may have been

back in Somalia again, but its concern was with future peacekeeping missions. If the United States ever hoped to employ Egyptian, Pakistani, or other forces in future multinational operations, it needed to demonstrate that Americans would put their lives on the line to protect them. And despite a real distaste for the peacekeeping business in Washington, Pentagon officials accepted that the military had better be doing something if they were to continue receiving huge budget allocations. "It's becoming inevitable that we're getting these types of capabilities thrust upon us," said a Pentagon source. "The attitude is, Let's dance with it rather than wrestle against it."

OUT OF SIGHT, OUT OF MIND

The Pentagon is now dancing in the ruins of Yugoslavia, and Somalia has slipped back into its pre-intervention stateless state. There is almost no evidence that the United States and UN were ever there, little trace of the \$4 billion that was spent.

Mogadishu remains a collection of clan-based enclaves, each protected by its own militia. Somehow people eat and survive. Children go to school. Businessmen import and sell goods. Occasionally a battle erupts.

Somalis are now responsible for their own future. There are no foreigners to blame for the failures. Occasionally a bright spot emerges, if only for a while. Elman Ali Ahmed, a Somali electrician, stayed through all the fighting and ran a technical school for Mogadishu's orphaned children and for former militia members. He spent his days trying to convince people to come to their senses and organize against the warlords for peace. On March 10, 1996, he was shot to death by gunmen who supported Aidid.

Elman always knew he was in danger. He understood that there was no such thing as a "pure" humanitarian intervention. Humanitarianism is political. It takes commitment and it comes with risks. ■

Burundi has, so far, escaped the genocide visited on Rwanda. But with more than 100,000 people killed in Burundi the last three years, there is growing concern because, as Jean-Pierre Chretien argues, "the fate of the two countries [has been] parallel, as in a game of mirrors in which each reflects the fantasies of the other."

Burundi: The Obsession with Genocide

JEAN-PIERRE CHRETIEN

In September 1961, the nationalist, broadly representative Union for National Progress (UPRONA) triumphed over parties manipulated by the Belgian colonialists in the pre-independence elections in Burundi. At the same time in Rwanda, the Hutu People's Liberation Party, or PALIPEHUTU, was victorious—the consequence of a socioethnic revolution brought about by Catholic missions and European administration. A generation later in Burundi, from October 1993 to the end of 1995, more than 100,000 people perished in an ethno-political crisis involving Hutu and Tutsi. A half century of colonial administration exercised according to the principles of a racial ideology that opposed "Bantus" and "Hamites" had not been able to destroy Burundi. But after 30 years of independent political administration, Burundi joined its neighbor from the north in the horror. The current crisis is the result of this recent evolution, which can be understood as having several stages.

THE STAGES OF ETHNIC AWARENESS

The assassination of Prince Louis Rwagasore, the charismatic leader of UPRONA, in October 1961, and the personal quarrels that immediately destroyed his party, favored the spread of the Rwandan model in Burundi. The ethnic ideology in these two countries, whose cultural and historic unity was strong, relies on a confusion between concepts of race and class. The Rwandan revolution between 1959 and 1961 was provoked by a

Hutu counterelite dissatisfied with the privileges of the former Tutsi elite, and reinforced by the Belgian administration's indirect rule. This tension spread progressively across the entire population: the Tutsi were collectively denounced as a race of feudal conquerors, and the Hutu were defined as the only true Rwandan people.

Burundi society had traits that enabled it to avoid this dynamic: the aristocracy of princes (the *ganwas*) distinguished itself from the Tutsi and the Hutu, with the former more highly represented in the governing milieu than in Rwanda. Yet political calculations favored the spread of the Rwanda model in Burundi: Hutu politicians quickly saw that they could profit from the defense of the minority Tutsi. This confrontation between two forms of logic, a "majority-based" Hutu one and a "security-based" Tutsi one, together with violence of an increasingly serious nature, characterizes the evolution of the country to this day.

The first major crisis began in 1965. After the assassination in January of Hutu Prime Minister Pierre Ngendandumwe, legislative elections in May showed an increase in ethnic solidarity, and 7 of the 12 ministers in the new government were Hutu. In October, an attempted coup was accompanied by the massacre of Tutsi peasants in the region of Muramvya (in the midwest of the country) by a militia organized by Paul Mirerekano, a Hutu UPRONA leader. The repression was terrible. Mass violence had become a political tool in Burundi. The importation of Rwandan revolutionary methods introduced fear into the Tutsi people, leading to the mistrust and the growing marginalization of the Hutu in the army and government, which was not the case at independence in July 1962.

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The second crisis occurred in 1972. The regime established in 1966 by Captain Michel Micombero's military coup saw the rise to power of a group of Tutsi extremists based in the southern province of Bururi. In April 1972, extremist Hutu refugees massacred Tutsi in this region, which was followed in May and June by a systematic extermination of Hutu elites across the entire country. These reprisals permitted the "Bururi group," a veritable political-military mafia, to impose itself as much at the expense of the Hutu as at the expense of elites from the northern and central regions of the country. Thus, the political-regional antagonism became as virulent as the ethnic conflict. But the genocide of the Hutu elites in Burundi in 1972 created a lasting fear among the Hutu and seemed to justify a posteriori the persecution of the Tutsi that had begun in Rwanda 12 years earlier. From this point on, the fate of the two countries was parallel, as in a game of mirrors in which each reflects the fantasies of the other. In the end, the democratic, Christian Belgian influence that had triggered the Rwandan socioethnic revolution also promoted the same process in neighboring Burundi.

In 1976, Colonel Jean-Baptiste Bagaza ousted Micombero. Between 1976 and 1987, Bagaza dealt with the results of the two crises through police intimidation and economic development. Burundi was effectively modernized, as was Rwanda during the same period under the presidency of General Juvénal Habyarimana. The most visible difference between these two "enlightened despots" lies in their relationships with the Catholic Church: the link between the church and the single-party National Revolutionary Development Movement (MRND) in Rwanda was tight, while in Burundi administrative persecution took place in anticlerical fashion.

This political-religious quarrel finally provoked Bagaza's fall in 1987, which benefited the new regime under Major Pierre Buyoya. It was also cleverly exploited by the Hutu extremist movement that had been reorganized abroad beginning in 1980 under PALIPEHUTU auspices: both the dictatorship and the persecution of the church was connected to Tutsi domination, although many Tutsi were equally affected by these politics.

The elements of the current crisis, in gestation for the past 30 years, crystallized in the late 1980s. The evolution that accompanied Burundi's development, along with the insufficient but real reintegration of the Hutu into civil society and the

changed international environment, had to free Burundi (like Rwanda) from the ethnically obsessed sociocultural ghetto and extricate it from the rubble of a political life in which the only change was that provided by military coups arbitrated by the Bururi faction.

The opening made by Pierre Buyoya responded to these issues, but it risked failure from the start under the shock of a new, violent crisis that exploded in the northeastern communes of Ntega and Marangaraof in August 1988. The process is characteristic of the strategy of tension devised by PALIPEHUTU. Rumors, circulating primarily in rural areas and in northern schools, described Buyoya as a new Micombero and announced the imminent return of the massacres of 1972; the purpose of these rumors was to incite the Hutu to "overtake the Tutsi" and massacre them preventively.

It was to accomplish this "task" that armed bands set out the night of August 15, 1988; in the days that followed, the Tutsi in the two northeastern communes were exterminated. Military repression, hesitant at first, turned into massive reprisals the following week, causing the flight of approximately 50,000 Hutu peasants to Rwanda. The violence succeeded in reigniting the fire of ethnic hatred and reinstating majority-based Hutu logic and security-based Tutsi logic. Fear became an essential tool of political action and ethnic definition—a strategy of terror that is still employed today.

THE ABORTED DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

In 1988 the fire was circumscribed by justice. The refugees began to return at the end of the year, and President Buyoya formed a new government, headed by a Hutu prime minister, Adrien Sibomana. Ethnic parity, known as "shared power," became the golden rule. Despite extremist threats from both sides (Tutsi conspiracies in 1989 and 1992, a PALIPEHUTU attack in the west of the country in November 1991) the course was set: in February 1991 a charter of national unity condemning "all discrimination or exclusion with respect to any part of the population" was adopted by referendum; in March 1992 a new constitution reestablished political pluralism; two leagues supporting the rights of man were created; an independent press emerged; and the predominantly Hutu Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU), which was created secretly in 1986 by expatriates, returned from Rwanda and was made an official party in July 1992. These exemplary political

changes seem to have been made possible by the national debate about unity, which addressed what was at stake in the "ethnic" question and, in a general sense, by the maturation of civil society.

However, in 1993 the approaching presidential and parliamentary elections showed that emotions connected to the memory of past dramas, especially the 1972 massacres, still haunted the collective mentality. PALIPEHUTU propaganda, circulated by the Rwandan Hutu integration movement (and expressed in the monthly publication *Kangura*, which devoted numerous articles to the "brothers" of Burundi) was covertly used to promote obsession with the return of persecutions and hatred of "the Tutsi army."

The presidential campaign manipulated ethnic solidarities and took advantage of the pedagogy of unity developed in the preceding years: FRODEBU apparatchiks used anti-Tutsi discourse capable of regrouping the Hutu majority and suggested that the Hutu of UPRONA betrayed their cause. UPRONA responded in a similar fashion.

Nonetheless, the transition seemed to go smoothly, as international observers noted. The elections, held in June 1993 without serious incident, produced nuanced results: the UPRONA candidate, Pierre Buyoya, received one-third of the votes (much more than the 14 percent typically given to the Tutsi group). FRODEBU's candidate, Melchior Ndadaye, won the majority of the vote, with 64 percent. The legislative elections confirmed this trend, with FRODEBU winning 65 of 81 seats.

After the elections, President Ndadaye denounced "the ethnic sickness" from which the country suffered and condemned all ideologies based on exclusion. He also formed a cabinet presided over by a Tutsi technocrat close to UPRONA, Sylvie Kinigi; granted amnesty to PALIPEHUTU terrorists, but also authorized the return of former President Bagaza; and he preached respect for the army, with which a good relationship seemed to be forming. However, Ndadaye had to respond to his partisans' desire for change and distribute positions to them. A "spoils system" was put into place that ranged from ministerial cabinets to school administrations, with former officials systematically replaced by FRODEBU militants.

The accelerated return of the refugees led to a number of conflicts. In many regions witch hunts

were launched against Hutu who had remained loyal to UPRONA. Moreover, incessant reports of agreements from Arusha to Rwanda created a disturbing situation on the northern border. In this context, President Ndadaye seemed to have taken excessive measures with certain of his partisans, but Tutsi extremists did not give him the chance to find middle ground.

In October 1993 the democratic process collapsed under the double shock of a military putsch and widespread killing whose genocidal form was predictive of what would happen in Rwanda six months later. Burundi's internal evolution has been suspended because of this double catastrophe.

The putsch that exploded on October 20 was the work of a battalion that was led by extremist officers nostalgic for the old regime and benefited from the complicit passivity of other units. Questions remain as to the nature of all the uprising's

sponsors (including foreigners), but the assassination of President Ndadaye and many of his direct collaborators represents an irreparable institutional and human rupture.

The ouster of the putschist group two days later and the military's declarations of loyalty made no difference. The government took refuge at the French embassy, except for two ministers who created a government-in-exile in Kigali that was protected by Rwandan President Habyarimana. Quasi-unanimous reprobation by civil society, by the largest part of Burundi's political class, and by the international community removed all hope of success from this criminal and absurd enterprise.

But the death of Ndadaye on October 21 gave the signal the next morning for the killings that took place in the northern, central, and eastern parts of the country and that consummated the destruction of Burundi society. The "popular anger" said to justify the killings poorly disguises their organized character: roads barricaded and bridges cut in a few hours, bottles of gasoline and machetes distributed to bands of young militants; systematic arrests of Tutsi and Hutu UPRONA members who were then executed in the name of slogans about the necessity of avenging the death of the president or sending the Tutsi back "to Egypt"; ethnic sorting in schools; and calls to the popular "resistance" through Radio Rwanda and RTL (the station that would distinguish itself during the Rwandan genocide).

The "popular anger" said to justify the killings poorly disguises their organized character.

This mixture of planning and horror (patients killed in hospitals, entire families slaughtered with machetes) would recur in Rwanda in 1994, sometimes with the same actors; many Burundi refugees affiliated with PALIPEHUTU would be implicated in the genocide in the neighboring country.

The Burundi pogroms affected whole provinces, such as Karuzi or Rural Bujumbura. Communes were entirely purified of their Tutsi elements; these included Mwumba, Rango, and Ruhororo in the north, and Mbuye, Rutegama, and Gishubi in the center. Making innocent Tutsi peasants hostages—which recalled what had happened in Rwanda for 30 years—prevented FRODEBU from organizing against the putschists and undoubtedly helped discourage foreign intervention. The reaction of the armed forces, at first weak or limited to the rescue of threatened groups, took the form of massive reprisals against Hutu peasants in several places, notably in the central and eastern parts of the country. The parties who were present disputed the roles they played in the killing of some 100,000 victims in this bloody crisis.

THE LOGIC OF CIVIL WAR

The impunity that the putsch leaders enjoyed prolonged the crisis; although many were arrested, including those responsible for the October 1993 massacres, no one was tried. Moreover, the genocidal nature of the massacre was systematically denied by FRODEBU.

Yet these events did not merely leave their traces in the cemeteries. In addition to the hundreds of thousands of Hutu refugees who fled, first to Rwanda (especially families sheltered by the men involved in the killings in the north of the country), then to Tanzania (in order to escape the reprisals), more than 200,000 “displaced” people (essentially Tutsi) were chased from their land. They were regrouped within Burundi in camps that were guarded by the army, where they lived in destitution. Young people from these camps made up the bulk of the Tutsi bands that sought vengeance, aided by soldiers who had lost families in this torment.

Burundi found itself in a general state of insecurity: in many places those who had not been refugees or who were “displaced” had to flee; periodically becoming “dispersed,” they joined repatriates from Rwanda after the summer of 1994, who returned with a new wave of Rwandan Hutu refugees. The country thus emerged from the events of October 1993 with a mutual mistrust

that led many Hutu and Tutsi to put an end to their ancestral cohabitation. This situation nurtured different extremist groups and encouraged the development of civil war.

The international reaction often leaned toward military intervention. However, the special representative of the UN secretary general in Bujumbura in 1994 and 1995, Ould Abdallah, tirelessly called for political solutions first and stressed the risk of a general explosion that foreign intervention would bring, especially after the failure of the UN Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) to handle the genocide in Rwanda. It is therefore necessary to try to better understand Burundi’s own political game over the past two years.

Beginning in December 1993, institutions were reestablished around the government, which was physically tucked away in a mansion on the edge of Lake Tanganyika and protected by members of the French military. The National Assembly was first reconstituted with the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, a close associate of President Ndadaye, as its head. In January 1994, the assembly unanimously made Cyprien Ntaryamira president of the republic; his selection was the result of a compromise between FRODEBU and UPRONA that had been made under the auspices of the UN. A new coalition government was formed in February, directed by Anatole Kanyenkiko, a Tutsi moderate from UPRONA. However, on April 6, 1994, President Ntaryamira and Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana were killed when their plane was shot down over Kigali, Rwanda. Burundi, unlike Rwanda, remained calm, thanks to political and military action.

With Ntaryamira’s death, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya constitutionally became president. What followed was persistent political infighting. The insufficiency of this political bargaining can be seen in the rise of violence in Bujumbura and other provinces that began as early as January 1994. The capital became the object of ethnic purification: in Kamenge, a northern suburb of the city, Tutsi residents were forced out in October 1993. In January 1994, in different quarters in the center and south of Bujumbura, Hutu were expelled during “*journées ville-morte*” (literally, “dead city days”) organized by small opposition parties and exploited by bands of young Tutsi. Murder and pillaging accompanied these operations. This continued in the suburb of Bwiza in March 1995. Only the Muslim suburb of Buyenzi and the bourgeois sectors of the center and the

east of Bujumbura remained mixed, despite provocations by extremists from the two camps. Insecurity in the city was heightened by assassinations and grenade attacks in the central marketplace, mixing the criminal and the political.

The formation of ethnic ghettos was reinforced by the organization of militia. At the beginning of 1994, FRODEBU youth were armed in the Kamenge section of the city with weapons purchased in Rwanda. The first shots were fired in February 1994 and the suburb became embroiled in urban guerrilla warfare. Between March 1994 and June 1995 attempts were made to disarm the suburb, and secret prisons were set up. The quarter was then permanently encircled by the army until its inhabitants left for the surrounding areas or for Zaire.

The choice of overt ethnic confrontation (Hutu militia against the Tutsi army) was made by the minister of the interior, Léonard Nyangoma, a former rival of Ndadaye's in FRODEBU and adept at Rwandan-style "majority-based" solutions. From March to April 1994 he denounced alleged riots on foreign radio stations. These extremist provocations led to his withdrawal from the government, and he left the country. In June 1994, he created the National Council for the Defense of Democracy, whose armed branch, the Forces in Defense of Democracy, collaborated with other Hutu extremist movements.

The collapse of the Rwandan government in July 1994 led to population movements that favored the multiplication of quarrels: the return of Burundi refugees who collided with "displaced" Tutsi, and the arrival of Rwandan refugees perceived as allies of Hutu extremists. Nyangoma's militia joined with soldiers from the former Rwandan army and with *interahamwe* militia who were hidden in eastern Zaire. Burundi began to look like a base from which the militias could launch attacks against the new Rwandan regime. Areas in central and the northern Burundi became sanctu-

aries or passageways between Zaire and Tanzania, provoking bloody confrontations with the army. The role of the latter was regularly denounced, with reality not always clearly distinguishable from propaganda.

It was in Bujumbura and in northwestern Burundi that a climate of civil war developed, leading people to expect the worst. In March 1995, attacks by Hutu militia in the center and the south of the capital were followed by terrible reprisals in Buyenzi and Kanyosha and an exodus toward Zaire. At the same time, carefully developed rumors provoked the departure of tens of thousands of Rwandan refugees toward Tanzania. The international press spoke only of the "second genocide" in preparation. In June and July, new tensions broke out with the assassination of dozens of Hutu students at the country's university. Vehicles were regularly intercepted on roads providing access to the capital, and their Tutsi occupants were massacred.

Fighting was especially pronounced in the provinces of Bubanza and Cibitoke; during the summer of 1995, a vast rebel camp was destroyed in the forest of Kibira. But the rebels succeeded in December 1995 and this January in cutting off the capital's supply of electricity. The primary victims of this insidious war were the peasants caught between the rebels and the army: Tutsi were massacred in camps of "displaced" people, and Hutu were punished, either for having denounced the rebels or for not having done so. Today there are numerous "displaced" Hutu protected by the army.

The situation is thus much more complex than it appears. Currently, official politics aims to create a centrist block that would neutralize extremists from both sides. All negotiation with the Nyangoma movement has been rejected, and Tutsi "intégristes" close to former President Bagaza have been disqualified as well. In Burundi, as in Rwanda, the search for a compromise between the actors of a racist logic has not been easy. ■

"The conflict in Liberia is not a result of cultural flaws or the stresses of modernity; Liberia's rebel leaders have proved to be quite sophisticated in building new commercial ties to the rest of the world. The war's cause can be traced to cutoffs of aid after the cold war's end and the collapse of patron-client politics that had bound Liberia's politicians to one man."

The Business of War in Liberia

WILLIAM RENO

Liberia's civil war is an especially horrible conflict. Since the war's beginning in December 1989, journalists have reported instances of cannibalism, torture, and random violence at the hands of young fighters bizarrely attired in women's wigs and shower caps. The world was given a further glimpse of the depraved character of this war when an otherwise minor rebel leader, Prince Johnson, videotaped the torture and killing of President Samuel Doe on September 10, 1990. The video, distributed throughout West Africa, shows a Budweiser-sipping Johnson singing a Jim Reeves gospel tune as he chops off the former president's ears.

Liberia, at first glance, is a prime candidate for the status of a "failed state." In an influential April 1994 *Atlantic Monthly* article, journalist Robert Kaplan voiced fears in Washington and elsewhere that Liberia and its troubled neighbor, Sierra Leone, are part of a growing "zone of anarchy" where armed young men fight because they have little else to do. Kaplan attributes the collapse of political order to demographic and environmental stress. Moreover, weak state administrations are unable to manage rising popular expectations and the competition for increasingly scarce resources. He argues that cultural traits and ethnic diversity undermine government efforts to manage these pressures.

But the conflict in Liberia is not a result of cultural flaws or the stresses of modernity; Liberia's rebel leaders have proved to be quite sophisticated

in building new commercial ties to the rest of the world. The war's cause can be traced to cutoffs of aid after the cold war's end and the collapse of patron-client politics that had bound Liberia's politicians to one man.

Liberia's seemingly anarchic violence conceals a reshaping of politics. Individuals may fight for the sake of fighting, but rational interests motivate the country's war leaders. They fight for power—to control resources and people. The war has been as much a battle over commerce inside and beyond Liberia's borders as it has been a war for territory or control of the government.

The novelty of this war goes beyond the strange attire of young fighters. Private investors and regional trade networks play a crucial role in bolstering the power of war leaders, freeing them to destroy Liberia's central government and infrastructure and to loot its economy. Kaplan is correct that Liberia lacks a government as it is commonly understood. Yet Liberia's "warlords" preside over political units that they and their supporters see as viable alternatives to the failed Liberian state.

Prospects for peace in Liberia are dim. Continued fighting outside the capital city of Monrovia threatens a peace agreement that went into effect in August 1995. The agreement, which created a coalition government of the three major rebel leaders, is scheduled to lead to disarmament and elections this September. The United States and United Nations, which back the agreement, consider it a sign that war-weary Liberians have come to their senses and have no rational alternative but to restore their shattered country. But the three rebel leaders, who under the agreement are included in the ruling Council of State, continue to jealously—and violently—guard their commercial ties in the countryside. Peace agreements like the current

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arrangement that do not recognize the crucial role ties to international commerce have played in sustaining Liberian war leaders' political authority are likely to fail.

THE COLD WAR ROOTS OF CONFLICT

Charles Taylor leads the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), the oldest of the eight armed factions in Liberia. Under the 1995 agreement, Taylor sits on the Council of State in Monrovia. Nonetheless, he continues to exercise exclusive control over parts of Liberia's territory. Since 1990 he has presided, with the help of foreign commercial partners, over a vigorous trade in timber, minerals, and agricultural products. This access to foreign exchange plays a vital role in financing Taylor's NPFL and arming his fighters.

Taylor has considerable experience running commercial enterprises, as do the other rebel leaders, including his rival, George Boley, head of the misnamed Liberian Peace Council. Many of these men began their political careers as associates of President Doe. Taylor, for example, headed Liberia's General Services Organization, which procured government supplies from overseas; Boley served as Doe's minister of state for presidential affairs and as education minister. Doe selectively tolerated and punished instances of corruption—he charged Taylor with embezzlement in 1985—to cultivate loyalty and dependence on him as the source of all patronage. But these men also used Doe's patronage to build their own ties to foreign businesses, ties they would find useful later.

The end of the cold war unraveled Doe's patronage network. In 1989, the nearly total cutoff of United States aid made it clear to Doe that he could no longer expect United States support (during the 1980s the United States gave \$500 million to Liberia—making it the largest per capita American aid recipient in Africa). With the Soviet Union gone, Doe's role as a host to an emergency military base and communications facilities no longer attracted United States aid, which had been the glue that held together Doe's patronage network. Thus when Taylor returned to Liberia with his 150-man invasion force on Christmas Eve 1989, few of Doe's associates saw any personal advantage in defending the regime. In fact, many state officials saw Taylor's invasion as a chance to strike out on their own while Doe was preoccupied with the rebel threat.

Legions of disgruntled young men, ill served by the old regime, grabbed at the chance to join the

new militias. Most dreamed of gaining some of the rewards of power that "Big Men" close to the old regime had kept for themselves.

COMMERCIALIZING THE WAR

The key to sustaining the Liberian civil war has been Taylor's skill at controlling and cultivating sources of foreign exchange; this has allowed him to arm his soldiers and conquer areas with easily exploitable resources. Taylor first turned to foreign firms with operations in Liberia. The advantage of this strategy was that it freed him from reliance on bureaucracies. As a wayward client of the former president, Taylor recognized that bureaucracies often harbor potential rivals. Effective bureaucracies are especially dangerous, since enterprising directors can use them to build their own power bases.

Accordingly, Taylor turned directly to foreign mining firms in Liberia for cash and military aid. Several European firms were involved in a proposed iron ore mining consortium on the Guinea-Liberia border. Through 1990 and 1991, Taylor exploited foreign business anxieties about maintaining access to the project site. A British firm, African Mining Consortium, Ltd., for example, paid Taylor \$10 million a month for permission to ship stockpiled ore on an existing railroad. A French-owned company, Sollac, also purchased stockpiled ore from Taylor.

Taylor was especially adept at attracting French corporate and diplomatic attention after the August 1990 arrival of peacekeeping troops. The troops make up the Economic Community of West African States's armed Military Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and enjoy United States diplomatic and financial backing. A large Nigerian contingent supplies about 80 percent of the force's 8,000 soldiers. This expansion of Nigerian influence in West Africa raised concerns among the French and their African allies.

French concern translated into diplomatic pressure to quell protests in the UN about the environmental impact of the proposed mining project (to be located in West Africa's largest remaining forest). This has helped keep corporate interest in the project alive, although ore shipments from Liberia ended in 1992. Jean Christophe Mitterrand, the son of the French president and director of the powerful official Cellule Africaine (Africa Unit), an agency in the presidential office responsible for managing French affairs in Africa independent of the French Foreign Ministry, assured local French

allies that Paris considered Nigerian expansion a threat.

France also became Taylor's main customer for timber products. NPFL-held Liberia became France's third-largest supplier of tropical timber in 1991. Taylor used Ivory Coast, France's closest regional ally, as a base to attract logging firms to the NPFL-held areas. Another West African state with close ties to France, Burkina Faso, served as a conduit for arms shipments to Taylor. (Diplomatic pressure by the United States after 1994 drastically reduced these shipments of mostly surplus Soviet and Chinese arms.)

Taylor's French and Ivorian allies have proved less reliable of late. France's rapprochement with Nigeria after 1994 and increased investment in petrochemicals there (in the wake of British and United States condemnation of Nigeria's repressive regime) have undercut Taylor's balancing of diplomatic interests. His Ivorian allies face pressure from Ivory Coast's government, which has recently grown more concerned about the spread of automatic weapons to local criminals, and border guards and paramilitary police gangs operating outside government control. Most important, ECOMOG's capture of the port of Buchanan in 1993 and its control over southern reaches of the Liberian-Ivorian border since 1994 have restricted Taylor from high volume mineral or timber trade.

Taylor's dealings with a wide array of smaller private logging firms now play a growing role in financing his organization. These collaborations increasingly involve Middle Eastern and African firms that use political and military ties with Taylor to gain access to cheap tropical timber that their larger competitors are unwilling or unable to exploit. Taylor continues Doe's practice of "arms for nature" swaps. As under Doe, firms receive special treatment in return for offering weapons, communications facilities, and training to local military forces.

These collaborations have been crucial to Taylor's military operations in the past. His December 1994 "Operation Envelope," in which the NPFL recaptured areas taken by ECOMOG allies, used logging firms' communications equipment and facilities.

¹Mandingo is a Liberian term for Muslims whose customs and crossborder social ties mark them as foreigners in Liberian eyes.

And in 1992, Taylor used the facilities of the Firestone rubber plantation near Harbel to launch his failed "Operation Octopus" invasion of Monrovia.

GUERRILLA PROFITEERS

Taylor followed a similar strategy of linking his interests to foreign officials, regional trade networks, and foreign markets on the western marches of his realm that once reached to the border with Sierra Leone. Diamonds mined illicitly in Sierra Leone—estimated by one industry specialist at \$100 million annually—have long been sold in Liberia. Consumer goods flow in the opposite direction. Many Mandingo middlemen traditionally participated in this transit trade.¹ NPFL fighters muscled in on the trade in 1990, establishing their own direct contact with Sierra Leonean officials involved in illicit commerce. Fighting between NPFL guerrillas and the Sierra Leone army broke out in 1991, reportedly sparked by a disagreement over an automobile deal.

Meanwhile, Taylor used the conflict to expand his commercial power. He backed the April 1991 invasion of Sierra Leone by the Revolutionary Unity Front (RUF), led by a former Sierra Leone army corporal, Foday Sankoh. Taylor recognized Sankoh as "governor" of Sierra Leone and used the war to remove Mandingos and corrupt Sierra Leone officials from the lucrative transborder trade. The RUF still preoccupies the Sierra Leone government, prolonging a war that has prompted two coups, killed at least 15,000 people, and made 1.5 million of Sierra Leone's 4.5 million people refugees.

Taylor's opponents also garner commercial benefits on the battlefield. Underpaid and ill-equipped ECOMOG commanders have found that their best strategy against Taylor is to use Taylor's local rivals to eliminate his sources of foreign exchange. ECOMOG offered logistical support to former Armed Forces of Liberia commander Roosevelt Johnson and former Information Minister Alhaji Kromah. These two formed the United Movement of Liberia for Democracy in May 1991. Since 1993 ULIMO has gained control of much of western Liberia, cutting off Taylor from Sierra Leone's diamonds. Allegations of Nigerian military collaboration in diamond and gold mining and transit operations in former NPFL areas have also increased.

In early 1994 ULIMO split into two rival factions

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under Johnson and Kromah. At first both enjoyed good relations with ECOMOG. Later, the Kromah faction, which is based in mineral-rich Bomi county in western Liberia, took direct control of local mining, edging out Johnson's faction with the help of several Nigerian ECOMOG commanders who received a cut of this trade in return for military support.

A third major faction appeared in 1993, again with ECOMOG and Nigerian patronage, and again centered on exploitable commercial opportunities. Led by Taylor rival George Boley, the Liberian Peace Council operates in former Taylor territory in eastern Liberia. Again, allegations have arisen of joint Nigerian-rebel force exploitation of local resources, in this case the timber trade on the Ivorian border. Press reports have also appeared alleging the use of forced labor on rubber plantations. Boley uses his Nigerian backers to help manage a large American firm's plantations, once part of Taylor's commercial empire. It is estimated that rubber exports from this and other Boley-run operations through the ECOMOG-controlled port at Buchanan totaled about 3,000 tons in 1994, generating revenues of approximately \$1.5 million.

Dissatisfied with the hefty cuts they have taken from guerrilla-associated commerce, ECOMOG troops have gone into business for themselves. They have concentrated on stripping the country of fixed assets—railroad stock, mining equipment, public utilities—and selling them abroad. This has denied guerrilla leaders the possibility of expanding into partnerships with foreign firms to mine iron ore. Instead, they are forced to concentrate on smaller scale agriculture or alluvial diamond and gold mining operations, which require strict control of local populations to discourage freelance operations.

All the warring groups hold tight reins on local populations, restricting their movement and trade. This anxiety over maintaining exclusive control over local sources of wealth has meant that ECOMOG forces have had little success in keeping armed fighters from blocking highways to collect tolls or restoring a nationwide economy as called for under the 1995 agreement.

Armed factions proliferated in the negotiations leading up to the 1995 peace agreement. Kromah created his ULIMO faction, the Bong Defense Front, and Taylor's NPFL produced the Lofa Defense Front. Meanwhile, remnants of Doe's army and their Nigerian allies continued to collaborate with compliant rebel leaders. This proliferation of groups is

part of a larger strategy by the main rebel leaders—and elements of the ECOMOG contingent—to multiply allied parties that will play a role in political negotiations. It is also a way of contracting out commercial-military operations to groups that can claim to be autonomous of the leaders in Monrovia.

THE TROUBLED PEACE AGREEMENT

The August 1995 peace agreement, which was brokered by Nigerian President Sani Abacha, finally brought together the main combatants in Liberia's war. The agreement established a six-member Council of State that includes Taylor, Kromah, and Boley. The major rebel leaders have stationed themselves in Monrovia and cooperate in the day-to-day operations of the provisional government. Ominously, ECOMOG's disarmament of Liberia's 60,000 soldiers, which was to have begun on December 15, 1995, has been indefinitely delayed as different factions fight among themselves and with ECOMOG.

The delay in disarmament shows that the peace agreement merely establishes a commercial status quo. Soldiers may not fight over a clear ideology or political program, but they continue to defend their operations against commercial rivals (for example, the LPC is still logging in Maryland county). Taylor warns that the LPC men who conquered Maryland county from his NPFL with ECOMOG's help in 1993 and 1994 are interlopers; his NPFL remains armed and will resist encroachments on commerce that he believes belongs to the NPFL. "If anyone thinks he can hide under the ECOMOG," Taylor has said, "he is living in a fool's paradise and will face the jungle justice." Likewise, Kromah's faction maintains that only it can oversee the mining areas it holds in Bomi county.

The main weakness of the most recent peace agreement is its use of ECOMOG troops to police the settlement and disarm soldiers. None of the faction leaders or soldiers who profit from commerce will trust ECOMOG so long as its commanders and soldiers have a personal stake in business deals with the various Liberian factions. As enforcers of the 1995 agreement, ECOMOG troops are now in a strong position to demand larger cuts in deals and to selectively punish unwilling factions. Those who do cooperate with the peace plan and disarm risk losing all access to the resources—and thus the political influence—they now hold.

This January fighting broke out in Bomi county between the ULIMO-Johnson faction and ECOMOG.

The rotation of local ECOMOG commanders in the ULIMO-Johnson stronghold of Tubmanburg in mid-December had removed an officer alleged to have collaborated in local mining operations. The new ECOMOG commander would not go along with the old arrangement and made moves to begin disarming ULIMO-Johnson soldiers. Johnson found this unacceptable. ULIMO-Johnson soldiers attacked ECOMOG troops, killing as many as 60, according to some reports.

This is a high-stakes contest for control of Bomi county. Diamond mines produced 163,000 carats in 1988, and the county produced 700 kilograms of gold in 1992. If ULIMO-Johnson forces surrendered their weapons to ECOMOG, they would lose their mines, which are their main source of revenue and power. Meanwhile, ULIMO-Kromah soldiers took advantage of the battle between their local rivals and ECOMOG to make their bid to control a portion of local mines.

Similar clashes have broken out between Boley's ECOMOG-backed LPC and Taylor's NPFL in southeastern Liberia since the start of the year. Fighting there centers on rubber and timber areas. Especially ominous for Boley, and a clear incitement for him to attack, have been reports that some local ECOMOG commanders are collaborating with Taylor's operation.

Spendthrift backers of the 1995 agreement have also created problems with its implementation. The United States and several other governments have pledged about \$175 million in aid to help rebuild Liberia. Most of this is promised for infrastructure reconstruction after the elections this September. Fears that this agreement will collapse have led foreign donors to hedge on pledges of money up front for disarmament. Washington sent its UN ambassador, Madeleine Albright, this February to warn that no aid will arrive if rebel leaders do not abide by the 1995 agreement.

Yet the immediate shortage of funds leaves ECOMOG soldiers underpaid, understaffed, and isolated in areas outside the capital, where they are more likely to turn to deals with warring factions. And the rebels, facing bleak prospects in a postwar Liberian economy, are reluctant to give up the guns that have provided their livelihood for the last six years.

THE COMMERCIAL TIES THAT BIND

Ultimately, conflicts like the one in Liberia are not about ideology or political programs: they are about looting resources and controlling people to make rebel leaders rich. Fears that these conflicts spread easily are well founded. But they do not spread because of demographic pressures or the stresses of modernization that Kaplan described. In Africa, the collapse of government is more often a result of an unraveling of a patron-client political system. These regimes can be torn apart when interlopers shut off sources of revenue that state leaders have used to reward loyal clients. Sierra Leonean rebels with Liberian ties have wreaked havoc on Sierra Leone's economy, diverting or strangling trade that once provided half Sierra Leone's tax revenues before 1991. At the same time, there is the danger that rivals in neighboring countries will use ties to Liberian warring factions to further their own fortunes. Sierra Leone's RUF owes its start to Taylor's NPFL. Domestic opponents of these groups will more readily adopt Liberian rebel techniques to survive when domestic resources that once financed broader political coalitions fall into the hands of narrower groups.

The 1995 peace agreement has produced meager results because it leaves the commercial underpinnings of the Liberian civil war intact. Predictably, the agreement's disarmament schedule is seriously delayed. Without disarmament commercial conflicts will continue in the interior. Wary Western powers will see continued ECOMOG engagement as a cheap way to deal with this crisis. Meanwhile, the scheduled date for the increasingly unlikely elections approaches amid new reports of fighting in several areas of the country.

The peace agreement will remain in jeopardy until its guarantors—especially the United States government—reduce the relative commercial advantages of warlord politics. Since illicit warlord trade is notoriously difficult to control, the most viable option is to help rebuild Liberia's non-warlord economy, and provide financial support and retraining to integrate warlord fighters into that economy. But this would be quite costly and hints, moreover, of a "state-building" enterprise that United States politicians have expressly rejected in Somalia and Bosnia. ■

"So far the Afrikaners' traditional deference to authority has dominated public responses to [South Africa's] majority government, but this has been easy because Afrikaner economic interests remain unchallenged even as formal apartheid has given way to legal equality."

The Afrikaners after Apartheid

BEN SCHIFF

In April 1994, apartheid, South Africa's unique system of legally imposed racial separation, officially came to an end when the African National Congress (ANC) won the country's first nationwide nonracial elections. The former ruling party, the white Afrikaner National Party, became the junior member of a government of national unity headed by President Nelson Mandela.

Two years later, even as the National Party deteriorates and negotiations over a new constitution promise to lead to majority government in 1999, the Afrikaners retain vast influence. Understanding why they remain a key element in black-ruled South Africa and a potential source of instability requires an examination of postapartheid South Africa in historical context.

Prior to 1994, outsiders usually portrayed white South Africans as divided between the Dutch-descended Afrikaner apartheid rulers and the moderately liberal, antiracist English speakers of British origin. Within each of these groups there was (and remains) a much broader spectrum than the simple racist-liberal division implies. Of the approximately 5 million whites, Afrikaners number about 3 million; English speakers comprise most of the rest, including a substantial Jewish community. There are also small Portuguese and Greek communities, and a newly arrived contingent of Eastern European immigrants. The African population includes close to 30 million people, and there are approximately 3.5 million Afrikaans-speaking people of mixed race or "coloured" background, and several hundred thousand Asians.

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Although the Afrikaners bear the onus of apartheid and its crimes, their system evolved from legal structures developed under English rule in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. After the Afrikaners took complete control of the South African government following their Nationalist Party's electoral victory in 1948, they fully articulated and legally rationalized a welter of existing restrictions into the codes of official apartheid ideology, policy, and law. The economic effects of apartheid—in its nascent form under British rule, and in full flower under the Nationalists—devastated the African population, and its legacies persist. Although whites currently fear and some are experiencing what they call "falling standards" in personal security, economic opportunities, and educational quality, they remain a highly privileged population.

But the Afrikaners are arrayed along a wide political spectrum. While elements of the old ruling clique still seek to retain power without formal authority, some (particularly younger) Afrikaners reject the old ways and embrace change. Although racial distinctions in South Africa may be subsumed by differences in economic privilege—as in Brazil, where the main axis of conflict is economic and in which privilege is partly identified with color but color is not the dividing element—Afrikaner nationalism could still emerge as a destructive force.

BIRTH OF A NATIONALISM

Afrikaners trace their origins to Dutch East India Company employee Jan Van Riebeeck, who landed at what became Cape Town in 1652, sent by the company to establish a victualing station. Dutch settlers came from the bottom of society—press-ganged workers, people fleeing prosecution, or those opting for emigration instead of jail.

Mostly illiterate farmers, they populated an isolated agricultural colony in which the power of the company and its European technology enabled them to suppress and dominate the indigenous local pastoralist and nomadic peoples.

French Huguenots fleeing religious persecution in the years after 1685 added a small educated elite to the Dutch farming population. Meanwhile, the Dutch East India Company imported slaves and indentured servants from its possessions farther to the east in what are now Indonesia and Malaysia. Despite the myth of racial purity later made the root of Afrikaner nationalism, sexual relations and intermarriage with local women and with those brought from the East Indies were relatively common among the early Dutchmen. The poor Dutch *boere* (farmers) could not afford the time or money required to return to the Netherlands, find a European wife, and then return to the colony.

The end of the Napoleonic period in Europe brought British rule to the colony, and a large tide of English and Scottish people immigrated in the 1820s and 1830s. Generally better educated, wealthier, more in touch with industrializing Europe and often more serious about their (Scottish Presbyterian) Calvinism than the Dutch, the English speakers became the British-controlled Cape Colony's elite. When the British Empire moved to eliminate slavery throughout its possessions, some Afrikaners stayed in the Cape Colony and accepted change. Others embarked on the "Great Trek," striking out to find new land and freedom from British rule in South Africa's interior.

These *Voortrekkers* (pioneers) repeatedly clashed with the Africans they encountered. Confronting the militarily powerful Zulus, the trekkers first suffered a massacre at the hands of Dingaan, a local Zulu chief, and then defeated him on December 16, 1838, in the Battle of Blood River. In Afrikaner history December 16 became the Day of the Covenant because legend had it that the Voortrekkers had promised God they would honor Him if they were victorious in battle. The hardships of the Great Trek became the foundational myth of Afrikaner nationalism. (Those who trekked—and their descendants—still disdain those Afrikaners who stayed in the Cape even as the latter often deem themselves educationally and socially superior to the trekkers).

After diamonds were discovered in 1867 along the Orange River, the British annexed the Boers' fledgling inland republics, the Orange Free State and the Transvaal Republic. Reacting to British

efforts to tighten control, the Boers rebelled and defeated the crown in the first Anglo-Boer War (called by Afrikaners the War of Independence) between 1880 and 1881. Afrikaner nationalism burst forth, spurred by anti-British fury. A few elite Afrikaners began efforts to "uplift" *die volk* (the people) and provide them with the trappings of a nation. They began with a language movement based on Dutch, but then focused on standardizing the local creole "kitchen language," combining elements of Dutch, Malay, and African languages into Afrikaans.

After gold was discovered in 1886 near what became Johannesburg, the British again moved to subdue the Boers. In the second Anglo-Boer War (or more commonly, the Boer War) fought between 1899 and 1902, a massive British army used scorched-earth tactics to defeat the Afrikaners. Approximately 26,000 of the roughly 30,000 Afrikaner war fatalities were women and children who died of malnutrition and disease in wretched British camps. The heroism of outgunned Boers and the suffering of their wives and children provided new fuel for Afrikaner nationalist fires.

The conservative British government that conducted the Boer War fell before the war ended, the electorate horrified by stories of the Boers' suffering. The Peace of Vereeniging, negotiated by a new, conciliatory British government, aimed to placate Afrikaner nationalism. The comparatively liberal race policies that had been proclaimed as part of British war aims were jettisoned, and dual English-Dutch domination was enshrined in law in 1910.

OUT OF UNITY, APARTHEID

Even with peace, Afrikaner leaders rightly perceived the British to be their primary rivals for economic and political power; however, the two groups collaborated against the indigenous population. In the Land Act of 1913, the Union of South Africa restricted African land ownership to "native reserves" that constituted a mere 13 percent of the country's land, crushing the last vestiges of independent African agriculture and relegating the Africans to lives of itinerant, landless wage labor. In the following decade drought and economic depression forced the Afrikaners themselves from the land and into the cities, only to face employment competition from cheap African labor. Its people lacking the skills and education necessary to compete with the British for influence and with the Africans for jobs, the Afrikaner leadership pursued two strategies. It laid

the groundwork for creating a new Afrikaner community capable of challenging British domination, and it successfully lobbied the government to reserve jobs for whites.

In 1918 a small group of young Afrikaner clerics and civil servants founded the Afrikaner Broederbond (Union of Brothers) to "uplift" the volk and proclaim Christian values; in 1922 the Broederbond became a secret organization. Throughout the drought and depression years of the 1920s and 1930s, as Afrikaner farmers struggled to survive migration into South Africa's cities, the Broederbond founded hundreds of nationalist educational, social, religious, cultural, economic, and political organizations that were centered around an ideology of Christian Nationalism developed in the Afrikaans Dutch Reformed Church. Apartheid—separating people in South Africa into their language "groups"—was a corollary of Christian Nationalist theory.

Broederbonders finally attained political preeminence with the Afrikaner Nationalist Party's 1948 electoral victory over Jan Smuts's ruling South African Unified (English and Afrikaans) Party. Apartheid became the ruling political ideology of the state. Although English capital still dominated business, the state became a giant machine for the enrichment and empowerment of the Afrikaners. Government monopolies in arms, steel, electricity and coal production, telecommunications, transportation, and postal services soaked up Afrikaner workers. South Africa developed one of the largest state sectors of any noncommunist country.

VOORTREKKERS: THE NEXT GENERATION

Since the Great Trek, Afrikaners have been a fractious people. Cape Afrikaners largely accommodated British rule while the Free Staters and Transvaal Boers fought against it. From 1910 to 1948 some Afrikaners formed coalition parties and governments with the British, while others developed the exclusivist nationalist ideology that became apartheid.

As the Afrikaner Nationalists came to power in 1948, divisiveness remained, although from the outside the volk appeared monolithic. When National Party ideologists revoked the coloureds' limited franchise in 1956, even though they were Afrikaans speakers and had stood closely with the Boers, the move disgusted a small group of

Afrikaners, who quit the party. In the late 1960s, in protest against government permission for some integrated foreign sports teams to tour South Africa, the Herstigte (Purified) Nasionale Party split on the right. As the apartheid system aged, a spectrum developed, ranging from "rigid" to "enlightened" National Party members, divided over tactics to maintain Afrikaner domination. The former sought ideological purity while the latter pursued pragmatism.

In 1982, when President P. W. Botha implemented a new constitution that included legislative assemblies for coloureds and Asians in addition to the white parliament, hard-liners left the National Party to form the Conservative Party. The Nationalists and Broederbond struggled to maintain the image of a monolithic Afrikaner volk while Botha's government responded to escalating African political protests with a thoroughgoing militarization of government.

Even as Botha cracked down, Broederbond moderates in the Dutch Reformed Church laid the groundwork for loosening apartheid, declaring in 1986 that apartheid could no longer be biblically justified. Church conservatives split to form the Afrikaanse Protestante Kerk (Afrikaans Protestant Church, or APK), which claimed more than 33,000 adult adherents in the early 1990s.

In the 1980s, international ostracism, sanctions, and global recession broke the long record of economic expansion, and South Africa faced financial crisis. By the time President Botha suffered a series of strokes in 1988, the National Party was ready to begin major reforms to apartheid. Those changes began with the election of F. W. de Klerk as president in 1989. De Klerk, who had emerged from the hard-line wing of the party, announced on February 2, 1990, an entirely new direction—legalization of the ANC, South African Communist Party (SACP), and other anti-apartheid organizations that had been banned since the 1960s—and indicated that the state's most celebrated political prisoner, Nelson Mandela, would be released. De Klerk had moved to the left of his party, apparently hoping to manage the forces of change. The Broederbond was secretly charting a course that would dispense with apartheid but retain its benefits. In 1992, APK leader Reverend Willi Lubbe charged that because de Klerk no longer embraced apartheid, "He's definitely not an Afrikaner."

Since the Great Trek, Afrikaners have been a fractious people.

In response, the Conservative Party and an ever-shifting group of far-right wing parties and paramilitary groups initially called for a return to 1950s apartheid, and then increasingly focused on a *volkstaat* (Afrikaner people's state) as their goal. But the problem with partition was and remains that Afrikaners lack a majority in any significant, geographically compact area of South Africa.

Dissent on the Afrikaner left had already begun to gain momentum from the mid-1980s. An erosion of religious faith reduced church power, and the growing toll of young Afrikaners killed, maimed, and psychologically damaged in the so-called border wars in Namibia, Angola, and Mozambique brought home the price of government ideology. An anti-National Party and Broederbond but pro-Afrikaner, left-wing newspaper, *Vrye Weekblad* (Free Weekly), began in 1988 to attack the government, exposing death squad activities and charging that the Broederbond's definition of Afrikaans culture was destructive.

Among some young Afrikaners, an "alternative" Afrikaans music movement took hold, exposing in microcosm youthful cynicism and countering the squeaky-clean official Afrikaans Federation of Cultural Associations (FAK). The nationwide *Voelvry* (Feel Free) music tour of 1990 was followed by two raucous *Houtstok* (Woodstock) festivals in 1990 and 1992. The *Voelvry* tour rocketed the Gereformeerde Blues Band (as in *Gereformeerde Kerk*, the culturally most conservative of the three Dutch Reformed Churches) to fame as it lampooned the political and cultural establishment. "We're cultural terrorists, we're planting mind bombs," said Theunis Englebrecht, a young writer, poet, and rock band leader. FAK suppressed the *Voelvry* recordings, prevented its stars from performing on Afrikaans university stages, and briefly banned them from the radio airwaves of the South African Broadcasting Company.

STRUGGLING TO KEEP POWER

During the period from de Klerk's February 2, 1990, speech to the April 1994 elections, civil violence escalated in South Africa. Newspaper reports described spiraling "black on black" violence and attributed it to a war between the Zulu Inkatha Freedom Party, led by KwaZulu homeland leader Mangosotho Gatsha Buthelezi, and Mandela's ANC. Massacres in townships and on commuter trains claimed thousands of lives and, according to some commentators, provided a foretaste of life under black majority rule.

A series of reports in the Johannesburg *Weekly Mail* in 1990 (later substantiated in court cases) showed that the government was providing money, weapons, and training to Inkatha. Top KwaZulu police officials who were members of South African intelligence agencies planned and covered up death squad activities. A steady stream of revelations gave increasing credence to charges that a clandestine "Third Force"—was acting at the government's behest to destabilize the transition. De Klerk's brother, Willem, a leading Nationalist strategist, asserted in 1992 in traditional Broederbond-speak, that "authoritative government is almost unavoidable in South Africa. . . . That applies to the transitional constitution as well as the final constitution." The old white elite had no intention of leaving South Africa's future to the forces of mere democracy or the black majority.

Mounting violence among blacks and threats from the Afrikaner right-wing appeared to strengthen the National Party's hand in transitional constitutional negotiations with the ANC. The Nationalists demanded "group" protections and a collective executive. The ANC rejected these positions, holding out for individual rights and a single president. The Nationalists dropped the "group" protections idea, accepting individual rights and seeking maximum power for provinces to weaken the central government. Federalism became the rallying-cry of de Klerk's Broederbond-elaborated position, while the far right continued to call for a *volkstaat*. Increasing numbers of Afrikaners on the left openly joined the ANC.

Meanwhile, the Nationalists reached out for new supporters. After 36 years of denying that coloureds were Afrikaners, the National Party suddenly broadened its definition to include all who spoke Afrikaans. The appeal was based on fear: the party claimed the coloureds could not trust the ANC to protect them from the black masses. Then, in 1993, the all-male, all-white Afrikaner Broederbond declared that it had ceased to exist, replaced by an Afrikanerbond open to all Afrikaans speakers who embraced Christian values. Hans Strydom, critic and long-time observer of the Broederbond, argued that it was simply going deeper underground. "They want people to think that they're not powerful. You must never underestimate them. . . . If you don't understand the Broederbond, you'll never understand what has happened to the Afrikaner."

The 1994 national election partly vindicated the National Party's strategy. The party won a majority

in the Western Cape, where a large coloured population (55 percent of the electorate) enabled it to gain 53.3 percent of the vote. In KwaZulu-Natal, with widespread evidence of electoral fraud, Buthelezi's Inkatha gained 50.3 percent of the vote.

Overall, the ANC garnered 62.7 percent of the vote, the National Party 20.4, Inkatha 10.5, the right-wing Afrikaner Freedom Front about 2.2 percent, the (mostly English) Democratic Party 1.7 percent, and the Pan Africanist Congress 1.3 percent (the remaining 1.2 percent was divided among 13 small parties). Under the transitional constitution, the six largest parties formed a government of national unity, with the ANC's Mandela as president and Thabo Mbeki of the ANC and de Klerk of the National Party as deputy presidents.

THE TRAVAILS OF UNITY

To gain agreement with the Nationalists on transition, the ANC made important concessions to Afrikaner concerns, guaranteeing there would be no wholesale layoffs of white civil servants and accepting minority party participation in the cabinet. The ANC backtracked from its socialist economic inclinations and adopted the capitalist model urged on it by the South African business community, Western governments, and international financial institutions.

The government has proved awkward politically for the Nationalists. It has kept de Klerk in the limelight, but he is vastly overshadowed by Mandela and Mbeki. Since the National Party is part of the ruling body, it must mute its criticisms of the ANC-dominated government. Thus participation in the national unity government has allowed the Nationalists neither equality of power nor the freedom of loyal opposition.

Ongoing constitutional negotiations—the new constitution is to be completed this May—have revolved around issues of basic individual rights, the division of powers between the provincial and central governments, and the composition of the central government. From 1992 the National Party pursued strong provincial autonomy, sometimes in collaboration with Inkatha. This February the Nationalists finally dropped their demand that the constitution require a national unity government after 1999.

The party's constitutional affairs minister, Roelf Meyer, resigned this March from government to lead the Nationalist's project to "rethink" itself and develop into a broadly based opposition party prepared to contest the 1999 elections. Critics

claimed that the party was in disarray, with de Klerk's closest advisers composed of whites unable to abandon apartheid attitudes. To the right, the party appeared to be losing members to the Freedom Front, and to the left, to the ANC. Meanwhile, it was attempting to develop a black constituency by promoting its few African members to highly visible positions in government.

Retention of the massive white (mostly Afrikaner) civil service has led to apparent sabotage and slowdowns that have hamstrung central government action. Major tensions within the police and defense forces continue. During the 1980s, the apartheid regime set up secret intelligence and assassination units, such as the Civil Cooperation Bureau, with front companies initially financed by the government and aimed at becoming self-sustaining. Some of the companies and an unknown number of the secret units' soldiers remain in existence and are possibly connected to "Third Force" operations. It is unclear to what degree criminality and political violence, particularly in KwaZulu-Natal, remains affiliated with the old regime and its functionaries.

Revelations about the apartheid regime's criminal operations have been pouring out of a court case in which a police death-squad commander, Colonel Eugene de Kock, is standing trial for more than 100 crimes, including several murders. In November 1995, former Defense Minister Magnus Malan and 19 other high-level defense, intelligence, and police officials of the old regime were charged with murder for establishing and financing the training of Inkatha-linked hit squads who subsequently, and with their knowledge, carried out the 1987 massacre of 15 people, mostly women and children, of the family of an anti-apartheid activist in KwaZulu. Freedom Front leader General Constand Viljoen initially called for Mandela to stop the proceedings, threatening Afrikaner mobilization. He later moderated his stand, saying that Afrikaners would watch the court proceedings closely. De Klerk also warned against provoking Afrikaner nationalist sentiment.

On March 11, the Malan trial began. Testimony from survivors of the 1987 attack was followed by that of former special forces soldier J. P. Opperman, who detailed the training and arming by South African Defense Force personnel of the death squad (including himself) that carried out the massacre. The March 8 *Johannesburg Mail and Guardian* reported that secret government documents handed to the court describe how in 1985

the government sought to use Inkatha Freedom Party leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi against the ANC and foment violence among Africans.

In early 1996, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission chaired by Archbishop Desmond Tutu began to deal with apartheid crimes committed from 1960 through December 1993. It remains unclear exactly what the relationship between the commission and the justice system will be; the Malan case appears to show that those who refuse to cooperate may find themselves subject to criminal prosecution.

Under the national unity government, wrenching changes are taking place in South Africa's educational system. In February, after an Afrikaans school in the small town of Potgietersrus refused to accept Africans, a court in the Northern Province (formerly Transvaal) held that schools could not exclude students on the basis of race. When the court forced the school to accept approximately 20 black students, all but approximately 30 of the school's 600 whites stayed away. Many Afrikaners view school integration as the beginning of the destruction of their culture, and government promotion of integration as a direct attack on them.

In October 1995, Ton Vosloo, the executive chairman of the Afrikaner publishing conglomerate Nasionale Pers, called on the ANC not to underestimate "the latent energy of Afrikaner nationalism" that might be unleashed in reaction to what he saw as attacks on Afrikaans. Vosloo argued that "black nationalism will have to accommodate Afrikaner nationalism, and not the other way around." Afrikaner nationalists protested when the South African Broadcasting Corporation announced a radical reduction in Afrikaans-language broadcasting. Right-wing demonstrators claimed that it was an effort to submerge the volk, and even among mainstream Afrikaners there were rumblings of a reborn nationalism. In turn, President Mandela has been highly sensitive to the language issue, reportedly excoriating ANC members of a parliamentary committee that recommended eliminating the use of Afrikaans in the South African military in favor of English.

Mainstream Afrikanerdom is torn between those wielding the images of nationalism and those pursuing accommodation with the majority. On the fringes, a right-wing rejectionism still simmers, while on the left there are a few Afrikaners

in prominent positions in the ANC. So far the Afrikaners' traditional deference to authority has dominated public responses to the majority government, but this has been easy because Afrikaner economic interests remain unchallenged even as formal apartheid has given way to legal equality.

EMERGING CONDOMINIUM?

When foreign capital dried up and multinational companies divested holdings in South Africa in the mid- and late 1980s, large Afrikaans economic institutions picked up equity in the manufacturing sector. Embracing the free enterprise ethic that was the ideology of its few remaining international sympathizers, the National Party began privatizing the government's massive holdings, and Afrikaans capital again moved in. Just as the black majority was about to gain political power, the white politicians cut state assets loose and steered them into Afrikaner hands.

The national unity government has taken no action to break up the centers of financial power. It has begun to implement a Reconstruction and Development Program of low-interest loans for land and home purchases, mass housing construction, and gradual extension of infrastructure to African residential areas, but it has moved slowly and the program remains tiny. Trapped between a stability-seeking international financial community and demands from the poor for an improvement in living conditions, Mandela and the ANC have chosen to provide stability with the hope that growth will gradually solve problems of poverty. White business interests have been courted, their fears assuaged, and their dominion over the economy maintained. The leadership elite has expanded, enriching former apartheid foes at the top of African society, but little has changed for the vast majority of the people.

While the shift in power favors the small African elite, South Africa still appears racially divided. The underclass remains African; however, as in Brazil and the inner cities of the United States, race will tend to coincide with, though no longer be the legally sanctioned source of, huge income and welfare gaps separating the elite from the masses. Even if the political will exists at the top of the ANC to carry out redistribution, such measures could undermine international support and reignite Afrikaner nationalism sparked by the volk's perception of a deterioration in its quality of life. ■

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Zimbabwe's Reluctant Transformation

VIRGINIA CURTIN KNIGHT

In the interval between Zimbabwe's independence in 1980 and the arrival of majority rule in South Africa in 1994, Zimbabwe had a unique opportunity to become the centerpiece of regional development and Western investment in southern Africa. In 1980, in the country's first year of majority rule, the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front won an overwhelming majority of parliamentary seats in internationally monitored elections. ZANU-PF was one of the nationalist groups that had fought for independence from the white minority Rhodesian government of Ian Smith. Prime Minister and then President Robert Mugabe's policies of racial tolerance and reconciliation won international acclaim, overshadowing the party's socialist rhetoric and ideological leanings toward the Eastern-bloc countries. Western governments and aid agencies eagerly, and often imprudently, rushed in with millions of dollars to fund the new government.

Zimbabwe also benefited from South Africa's apartheid-era pariah status. Rather than locate in South Africa, diplomatic missions and international agencies set up regional headquarters in Zimbabwe, where they enjoyed the country's easy race relations, good infrastructure, and temperate climate. Zimbabwe's location bordering, or easily accessible to, regional hot spots like Angola and Mozambique also made it a convenient base for refugee relief agencies and the foreign media.

But 16 years after independence, the government cannot pay its bills, the domestic manufacturing industry is closing down, and foreign investors have failed to materialize. The diplomatic missions and aid agencies have moved to South Africa. The international lending agencies

are withholding funds until the government begins to decentralize the economy. Once hailed as a model for democracy by Western governments and agencies, Zimbabwe has lost its luster in the light of democratic South Africa and its charismatic president, Nelson Mandela. Zimbabwe is now perceived as a de facto one-party state, ruled by an aging, autocratic president whose policies have enriched a new black political elite and white business community.

In most democratic countries, national elections act as a barometer of the well-being of the populace. An incumbent president running on a record like 72-year-old President Mugabe's would have faced a serious challenge at the polls. However, in the presidential elections held March 16 and 17, Mugabe initially faced two opposition party candidates whose parties were in total disarray, without funds, dominated by overbearing personalities, and unwilling to unite under a common goal.

In the week before the election the candidate of ZANU-Ndonga, the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, withdrew, claiming he had evidence that the Central Intelligence Organization was planning to frame him in a plot to assassinate the president. Two days before the election, retired Methodist Bishop Abel Muzorewa of the United Parties also withdrew, saying the election was inherently unfair. Despite the efforts of the ruling party to turn out a large vote, only about 20 percent of the electorate bothered to go to the polls.

POLITICAL ECONOMICS

At independence Zimbabwe's economy was skewed in favor of the white minority, which made up less than 1 percent of the total population. The vast majority of blacks were subsistence farmers, packed into overcrowded communal lands generally located in areas of lower rainfall. Unemploy-

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ment was low in urban regions because the former white government had maintained a labor-intensive economy based on low wages.

The new government had the backing and goodwill of the international community. Zimcord, an international donor conference held in Harare in 1980, raised \$1.2 billion in loan assistance; with the promised aid the government hoped to implement a reform program, "Growth with Equity." The program envisaged an annual growth rate of 8 percent in GDP, and a 3 percent annual increase in employment.

After the first year, economic growth was handicapped by a worldwide downturn in commodity prices and several years of poor rains. The employment growth that did take place was in the public sector, predominantly in the civil service, which expanded by 40 percent. The average annual rate of growth was barely 3 percent, broadly in line with the rate of population growth. But when the world economy recovered, Zimbabwe's did not.

Committed to a socialist program, the ruling party used the strong central government it had inherited to try to correct the economic disparities between whites and blacks. But economic policy became a political football in the contest between those favoring a strong centralized socialist state and those calling for a liberal market economy. Economic policy suffered from ideological differences among the cabinet members, who were mostly political appointees. Bernard Chidzero, the country's first minister of economic planning and finance, was one of the few technocrats in the government's early cabinet. But Chidzero did not have a political constituency and often could not prevail over the politics.

LICENSE TO STEAL

At the outset, the government retained many of the regulations affecting business that it inherited from the Smith government. The white government had regulated the economy to create a wealthy white middle class. The black government used the same regulations to create a wealthy black middle class. Initially, the new government protected domestic industry from outside competition with price controls and high tariffs. Imports were regulated through licenses, which were generally awarded to advance the government's political agenda of spreading the wealth to emerging black businessmen.

The import license system invited abuse. The licenses went to people with political or family

connections and they were, in turn, sold to importers or manufacturers who offered to pay the most, regardless the relevance of the product to the economy. For their part, some manufacturers bribed officials for essential documents; they also often arranged for invoices from buyers abroad to reflect lower prices, with the difference between the actual cost and the reported cost going into foreign bank accounts. Corruption permeated most aspects of society, as people chased after goods in short supply. In one of the most publicized cases of high-level corruption, cabinet ministers took advantage of their positions that gave them access to automobiles from the state-owned vehicle assembly plant at concessionary prices. Some resold the cars at triple the original cost or simply ordered them for others for a fee.

After failing to keep the government-controlled press from publicizing the story, Mugabe ordered an investigation into the abuse of government positions. While the government was widely hailed inside and outside the country for carrying out the investigation, it quickly lost credibility when Mugabe pardoned the implicated cabinet members.

Essential industries, whether government controlled or private, often could not provide basic services to the public because they did not have access to import licenses and imported goods. A classic situation was that of the Zimbabwe Electric Supply Authority, the government-owned electricity provider. During the drought in 1991 and 1992, the country could not supplement its electric power generation from the Zambezi River dam. Normally, the coal-fired turbines at the Hwange plant provided the bulk of the nation's energy, but it could not produce sufficient electricity because it lacked the foreign currency to buy critical spare parts. Electricity for industry and domestic consumers was rationed, with frequent unscheduled and costly blackouts.

In a further effort to transform ownership of the economy, the government bought into publicly held corporations and purchased some foreign-owned companies and institutions. It acquired shares in South African-owned Nedbank (which is now the state-controlled Zimbank). It bought a large number of shares in the Astra Corporation (domestic and automotive paints), Caps Holdings (pharmaceuticals), Delta Corporation (hotels, foodstuffs), the Argus Group (newspapers), Kingstons (a national book distributor), and the previously Anglo-American-dominated Wankie

Colliery Company. It also bought the largest private ranch in the country and turned it over to a trust administered by Vice President Joshua Nkomo.

Plans were also announced to redistribute land to peasant farmers. Originally the government adopted a policy of acquiring land on a willing-buyer, willing-seller basis. Without the funds to acquire land, politicians—especially Mugabe—spoke of taking the land from white farmers without payment. In 1991 the law was changed to allow the government to acquire “underused” farmland. According to the February 2, 1996, *Africa Confidential* (London), “most of the resulting ‘resettlement’ involved the renting by senior politicians of large tracts of land, while the poor peasants got nothing.”

In most cases the people appointed to the boards of government-controlled companies and the 40 parastatals were politically loyal but untrained in the business of running multimillion-dollar corporations. Without a professional civil service to draw on, the “home boy” network and family and tribal affiliations provided entrée into these positions.

The situation at the Hunyani Paper Corporation, a pulp and paper company, serves as an example: a political appointee named managing director nearly bankrupted the company because of his poor management skills, and the government was forced to sell it. Under private stewardship the company has returned to profitability. The same situation prevails in the public service. When decisions are made, the bureaucracy often fails to act on them, finding it safer to do nothing instead of taking responsibility for an unpopular action.

Government also kept a tight rein on profits from foreign corporations. It blocked funds, restricted remittances of profits, and refused to sign investment guarantees. In short, it did everything it could to discourage new foreign investment, deny access to improved technology, and hinder the creation of new employment. During the 1980s the H. J. Heinz Corporation was the only new nonmining United States investment in the country.

For the first eight years after independence, public spending fueled the economy. The public sector's share of GDP rose from 24 percent in 1980 to 36 percent in 1993. The government borrowed

freely and spent freely, rewarding supporters and enhancing party coffers. At its height, the cabinet included 56 ministers and deputy ministers, all of whom had housing allowances, drivers, guards, and Mercedes-Benzes.

GROWING INDEBTEDNESS

Despite the lack of economic growth, the Mugabe government devoted large amounts of money to social programs, such as education and health, that had been neglected by the white government. To finance the expansion of social programs, the government borrowed from the domestic market and from international lending agencies. While it did make great advances in providing subsidized education and health services throughout the country, the government also enlarged the military, whose defense budget as a percentage of GDP, according to a 1992 World Bank report, was the third highest in Africa in 1992, after South Africa and Libya.

However, by the end of 1995 government debt had risen from \$100 million, which it inherited at independence, to \$4 billion. In the current fiscal year, total debt servicing is \$722 million in interest payments; along with \$600 million in repayments of capital, debt absorbs nearly 50 percent of total government expenditures.

It is this debt that has so dramatically affected the economy. To finance the debt and meet ongoing expenditures, the government has been borrowing about 60 percent of all the funds in the domestic market. With government draining liquidity from the market, the cost of borrowing has risen; at its peak, rates were over 40 percent. Manufacturers and investors have found the cost of borrowing money too prohibitive. Unable to invest in new production operations or equipment, local concerns have shut down and dismissed workers. The number of unemployed people is reported at 2.5 million (out of a labor force of 4 million). The December 1995 First Merchant Bank quarterly report predicts that in the next five years, “on our current depressing path, our well-educated but unemployed people who fall within the 17 to 30 age group will equal the total number we now have in formal sector jobs.”

IMPOSED REFORM

Continued overspending by government min-

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istries, enormous losses by the parastatals, foreign currency shortages because of debt repayment, and a stagnating economy created a financial crisis. This forced the government in 1990 to accept an economic structural adjustment program (ESAP) to receive additional funds from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The demands of ESAP (which Zimbabweans have dubbed the "Ever Suffering African People") compelled Zimbabwe to shift its policies away from centralized control and social programs to a market economy. The main requirements of the economic structural adjustment program are to: devalue the currency; reduce spending in the public sector (resulting in the imposition of user fees in the social sector); abolish price controls; liberalize trade (by ending import licensing); privatize public enterprises; reduce subsidies to parastatals; withdraw subsidies on food and other commodities; dismiss workers; end wage freezes; and deregulate laws protecting job security.

In the first three years of the program the government relaxed its control over the economy. The Zimbabwe dollar (Z\$), worth US\$1.40 at independence, was devalued; today it is worth 12 cents and is weighted against a basket of currencies. Import licensing was abolished, which allows any importer with foreign currency to import goods. Exporters can now retain a much larger share of earned foreign exchange.

As a result of these liberalization measures, the supply of foreign exchange vastly improved and imported goods became available. However, the price of these goods is high, putting them out of reach of most Zimbabweans. Moreover, as the government liberalized the economy, it also withdrew support and subsidies from social services. Health and education facilities began to charge for their services, requiring all but the very poor (those earning less than Z\$400 a month) to pay school and clinic fees. The cost of living escalated, with inflation running between 25 and 40 percent, which cut into the purchasing power of basic wage earners.

Protected for so many years from competition and with guaranteed prices, the local manufacturing industry has failed to compete with imported goods. In addition, with the high price of borrowing money, manufacturers have been unable to upgrade their equipment. The textile industry has been especially hard hit. Before 1992, the Zimbabwe textile industry was a major private employer, with most of its finished goods going to

South Africa. To protect its own textile industry from dumping by Asian countries through other African nations, the South African government in 1992 renegotiated a long-standing trade agreement with Zimbabwe, rescinding the Zimbabwe exporters' preferential tariff rates.

The loss of the South African market and the competition from used clothing that has entered Zimbabwe illegally has ruined the local textile industry. In the first 9 months of 1995, textile manufacturing declined by 62 percent over the previous year; 6,000 textile workers lost their jobs.

Manufacturing also declined by 14 percent over the previous year. The downturn in this sector has seriously eroded the job market; in Zimbabwe, one worker's pay usually supports about seven other people. Moreover, fewer than 20 percent of those graduating high school each year find employment in the formal economy. The average Zimbabwean is now faced with fewer employment opportunities, higher living costs, and possibly more dependents as the AIDS pandemic takes its toll on family wage earners.

THE COSTS OF OVERSPENDING

Displeased with the reluctance of the government to reduce its spending and the deficit, the IMF in September 1995 suspended its disbursement of balance of payments aid worth \$120 million; the World Bank followed the next month. Government spending eats up about 40 percent of GDP, and the IMF and World Bank would like to see this halved. For 1995, the recurrent expenditure on wages and salaries exceeded the government's total revenue by \$388 million. The government will probably borrow \$440 million from the domestic market in 1996 to pay its bill, keeping interest rates high and shutting out private sector borrowers. Overspending by ministries in 1995 created a budget deficit three times that projected.

To curb unchecked spending and reduce the government's operating expenses, Finance Minister Ariston Chambati issued an order last year denying additional funds to ministries spending more than their monthly budget. As a result, government departments are unable to pay their bills; the Ministry of Health, for example, was cut off by its pharmaceutical suppliers in November because the ministry owed millions of dollars. The army, police, and prison service in November owed Z\$1.4 million to a local medical company.

"Debt and the need to provide for debt service now casts such a long shadow over the Zimbabwe

economy that almost all the country's economic policies are having to be designed to accommodate it," an editorial in the September report of the First Merchant Bank of Zimbabwe Limited noted. After the IMF withheld funds, the government suddenly took another look at areas where it could cut expenditures. Braving a storm of protest from a section of his power base, Mugabe announced cuts of \$4.3 million in the annual housing budget for low-income groups and \$2.5 million in the state health budget, down from \$9 million.

However, after he announced the cuts Mugabe, in practically the same breath, awarded himself, his top officials, and 150 members of parliament salary increases ranging from 116 to 134 percent. Mugabe's annual salary and allowances would jump from \$21,000 to \$49,000 in July 1996. The salaries of the two vice presidents, Joshua Nkomo and Simon Muzenda, would be increased from \$16,000 to \$35,000. At the same time, the per capita GNP in Zimbabwe in 1993 was about \$520.

"This latest development by government is despicable and incredible. But it only serves to reveal the hypocrisy," a furious Felix Mafa, national chairman of the Zimbabwe Teachers' Union, said of the salary increases. "This action has inflamed our anger. . . . The people themselves will decide what action to take," he said. The people have shown anger and frustration, but only in isolated incidents and usually in reaction to some other event. In several instances when police have overreacted in attempting to control crowds or demonstrations, the crowds have turned on the police, burning and stoning vehicles with government license plates and destroying government property. Protesting university students have also become violent, destroying facilities on campus.

THE IMPLICATIONS

In most democratic societies, multiparty elections reflect the sentiments of the people as to whether the government of the day has met their expectations or is judged able to do so. In Zimbabwe, the electoral structure is so skewed in favor of the ruling party that this kind of judgment cannot be made.

Under the current structure, ZANU-PF is subsidized by the government by about Z\$30 million annually. In 1990 parliament passed a law that any political party elected to 15 or more parliamentary

seats was entitled to a government subsidy. ZANU-PF also has unfair access to the media—radio, television, and daily papers—that the government controls. The media serve as a continual propaganda platform for Mugabe and ZANU-PF and deny the opposition substantial exposure except when stories detract from opponents.

The threat to the ruling party comes not from the opposition but from divisions within the party, whether ideological or along tribal and regional lines. Grassroots members become independents when the party hierarchy tries to impose candidates on their constituencies. Margaret Dongo, a former guerrilla fighter in the war against Rhodesia, was a ZANU-PF member of parliament. She had support from the urban poor because she articulated their grievances and criticized the corruption in the ruling party. When ZANU-PF nominated Vivian Masawita as its candidate for parliament in the 1995 election, Dongo defied the party by running as an independent. When she lost she appealed the results to the court, saying that the ruling party bused in voters who did not belong in that constituency. The High Court agreed with her and ordered a special election. Despite all the resources the ruling party lined up against her, Dongo won.

In the face of a declining economy and aging party leaders, ZANU-PF is facing challenges from within. Dongo's victory showed that the party is not invincible and her victory may encourage others to operate outside party constraints. The current challenges to ZANU-PF are, however, mere skirmishes. The real contest will begin if Mugabe steps aside because of ill health or if he dies in office. He has steadfastly avoided discussing the issue. Addressing a news conference to announce his new cabinet last April, Mugabe skirted the question about a successor, saying it was not his duty to appoint one.

His two vice presidents are not serious successors: Joshua Nkomo is 79 years old and Simon Muzenda is 73. According to the constitution, one of the vice presidents would serve as interim president until new elections are called should the president not be able to fulfill his duties. The younger generation seems content to bide its time; it is the middle-aged group of men like Minister of Mines Eddison Zvogbo, Minister of State for National Security Dr. Sydney Sekeramayi, and Emmerson Mnangagwa who are most ambitious

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and are often mentioned as possible successors. David Karimanzira, the minister of information, posts, and telecommunications, is mentioned as a Mugabe favorite.

In forecasting Zimbabwe's future, the role of the military cannot be discounted. University of Zimbabwe political science lecturer John Makumbe has speculated that "it would be very difficult for a person without military experience to replace Mugabe, because there is a real danger that those who have some military experience would stir up problems. . . [A] person who has neither military nor liberation war experience of any kind, even if he is in ZANU-PF, will really be living on the edge of the danger of an overthrow."

"African leaders are generally wary of succession," Makumbe continued. "And to ensure that they remain within the limelight unchallenged, they tend to surround themselves with geriatrics or with weak people who are politically unacceptable as successors within their parties."

Mugabe failed again to raise the issue of succession at the 1995 party congress. Makumbe says Mugabe "refuses to see a situation where he will retire gracefully and give way to younger people. But by not grooming a successor, he is being negligent of the national interest. . . and stability because if he dies in office there will be serious in-fights, some of which we have already witnessed, although restricted to one province. How-

ever, failing to groom a successor could prove disastrous in the long run for a mammoth party like ZANU-PF."

WHAT LIES AHEAD?

The greatest challenge facing any Zimbabwean government is the country's financial situation. Because of its enormous debt, government is the main actor at the moment. It must cut its spending to free up money for domestic borrowers to invest and create jobs. As peace prevails in southern Africa—with Mozambique and Angola opening up and with South Africa's growing economy and market—Zimbabwean manufacturers have an opportunity to compete regionally. The government squandered its opportunity 16 years ago when it had donor money to fall back on. With that gone, more judicious financial decisions must be made.

The greatest threat to stability in Zimbabwe is the failure of the economy to provide security. If firms continue to liquidate, if 100,000 high school graduates fail to find employment each year, and if inflation continues to put most goods out of the reach of most of the people, the prospects for a peaceful country will be undermined. This is especially true where there is no realistic political alternative to the current administration and no groundwork has been laid for such an alternative. ■

"Supporters of Sahrawi self-determination and the [UN] peace plan assumed that in accepting the plan, King Hassan had backed himself into a corner. It now appears that the UN and other powers—including the United States—are letting him wriggle free. . . Time appears to be on the side of the Moroccan occupation."

Western Sahara: Peace Derailed

STEPHEN ZUNES

On Africa's Atlantic coast, at the western border of the Arab world, lies Western Sahara, the site of Africa's longest post-colonial war. While more than 1 billion people have been successfully decolonized over the past 50 years, Western Sahara, with a paltry population of under a quarter million, is still recognized by the international community as a non-self-governing territory.

In 1991, UN peacekeeping forces were dispatched to supervise a referendum that would determine the future of this largely desert country that is rich in phosphates and other minerals. Five years later, peace remains a distant hope.

PARTITION AND INVASION

Just before the scheduled end of Spanish colonial administration in 1976, Western Sahara—then known as Spanish Sahara—was partitioned between Morocco and Mauritania. Spain had promised the territory independence, but pressure from Morocco forced the Spanish government, which was in the midst of its own delicate transition to democratic rule, to back away from its commitment.

In November 1975, Spain signed the Madrid Accords, which granted Morocco administration of the northern two-thirds of the colony and Mauri-

tania the remainder. The United States played a major role in pressuring a reluctant Spain to sign the agreement, a product of its concern about the possible leftist orientation of an independent Western Sahara and fear that not meeting territorial demands might result in the overthrow of Morocco's King Hassan II, a strong American ally.

The Polisario Front, the nationalist movement of the Western Sahara (Sahrawi) people that had been battling Spain for independence, rejected the accords; Morocco then seized the territory by force. The invasion was widely condemned by the international community. The UN Security Council passed a resolution deploring the invasion and calling for the withdrawal of Moroccan forces and a negotiated settlement. In addition, the UN reaffirmed the "inalienable right of the people of Spanish Sahara to self-determination," and insisted on an end to the fighting and a referendum to decide the fate of the territory. However, because of French and American objections, no enforcement mechanisms, such as economic sanctions, were included.¹

THE COSTS OF WAR

Morocco's 1975 invasion, which included widespread attacks on civilians, forced the majority of Western Sahara's population into exile in neighboring Algeria. Nearly 170,000 Sahrawis now live in a series of refugee camps spread out over an approximately 2,500-square-mile desert territory southeast of Tindouf, where they have been effectively granted autonomy by the Algerian government.

Three months after the Moroccan invasion, the Polisario Front proclaimed the creation of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR); it has

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¹Critics of this effort by the United States to block effective UN action against Morocco note that it stands in stark contrast to the United States response 15 years later to a similar invasion by a large Arab country (Iraq) of a small resource-rich southern neighbor (Kuwait).

maintained most of its offices in liberated territory within Western Sahara, even as most of the civilian population lives in its administered refugee camps in exile. Over 75 nations recognize Western Sahara as an independent state, and the SADR is a full member of the Organization of African Unity, the UN General Assembly, and the World Court—all of which have called for Western Saharan self-determination.

In 1979, after a series of losses on the battlefield, Mauritania signed a peace treaty with the Polisario and renounced sovereignty over its share of Western Sahara. But Morocco simply annexed the Mauritanian share.

By 1981, thanks in part to substantial military aid from Algeria, the Polisario had driven Moroccan forces back until they controlled only 15 percent of Western Sahara and even began to launch strikes into Morocco itself. However, since Morocco had long been considered an important Western ally against communism, France and the United States—while stopping short of formally endorsing Morocco's takeover—came to Morocco's assistance.

Under President Ronald Reagan, the already substantial American support for the Moroccan war effort launched under President Jimmy Carter was greatly expanded to include direct assistance in counterinsurgency operations, efforts that reversed the tide of the war in Morocco's favor. Part of Morocco's military success was the construction—with United States support—of a series of heavily fortified sand walls, now 1,500 miles long, to prevent Polisario penetration into virtually all of Western Sahara. The walls led to a war of attrition. By the time a cease-fire went into effect in 1991, more than 10,000 people had been killed. Meanwhile, Morocco had sent tens of thousands of settlers into the occupied territory as part of its effort to incorporate it into a "Greater Morocco." As a result, Sahrawis are now a minority in their own country.

In addition to the devastating impact on the Sahrawi population, the war affected Morocco as well, especially economically, costing the kingdom over \$1 million a day. Recent reform efforts supported by the International Monetary Fund have led to some progress on paper, but the benefits have yet to reach the majority of Moroccans. With a foreign debt of more than \$20 billion, continued high unemployment, and an export-oriented economy vulnerable to external pressures, Morocco is unlikely to recover economically as long as it

maintains its occupation of Western Sahara. In addition to the expense of the large armed presence along the sand walls, there are the costs of internal security against a restless population, as well as the enormous expense of ambitious development projects in the occupied regions of Western Sahara aimed at attracting Moroccan settlers and winning the support of the indigenous population.

STALEMATING THE PEACE PROCESS

The peace plan between Morocco and the Polisario was approved by the UN Security Council on April 29, 1991. The resolution called for a referendum that would give Western Sahara's population the choice of independence or incorporation into Morocco. Refugees were to be repatriated to take part in the voting along with Sahrawis still living in the territory. The roster of eligible voters was to have been based on a 1974 Spanish census.

The resolution also created MINURSO—the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara. Under the peace plan, approximately 2,800 military and civilian personnel were to oversee the cease-fire and conduct the referendum. This contingent included 30 United States military observers.

Observers were divided over the likely outcome of a fair referendum, but most predicted a Polisario victory. However, the vastness of the territory and the relatively small size of the UN peacekeeping force raised serious questions about the possibility of a fair vote. Furthermore, King Hassan failed to turn over administration of the territory to the UN as promised, leaving many observers to wonder whether the population would be able to campaign or vote without intimidation.

Once the cease-fire took effect, Morocco began to hamper the referendum's implementation, which was scheduled for January 1992. Morocco blocked deployment of many of the UN peacekeepers and refused to allow UN-chartered supply ships to unload at the Moroccan port of Agadir with vehicles, prefabricated houses for MINURSO personnel, and other materials. Morocco also initially refused to allow the Identification Commission, which was charged by the UN with compiling and validating the voter rolls, access to the Western Sahara, while a number of foreign visitors, including journalists, the president of the Commission on Development and Cooperation of the European Parliament, and representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross and UN High Commissioner on Refugees, were also denied

entry. There were widespread reports of harassment of journalists and MINURSO personnel by Moroccan authorities, including threats to fire on peacekeeping patrols and the physical obstruction of UN vehicles. The Moroccans continued to let army units roam at will, refusing to redeploy them or reduce their numbers to the 65,000-man level as required. In addition, the Moroccans would not provide information on the location or numbers of their troops in the territory.

Soon after the cease-fire, the Sahrawis living in Western Sahara were informed by Moroccan authorities that they could not make contact with any foreigners, including journalists or members of MINURSO. Strict disciplinary action was promised to violators; MINURSO personnel stationed in the Western Sahara capital of El Aaiún reported their frustration at not being allowed to talk with the local population. Assemblies, including social occasions such as weddings, are still forbidden. Moroccan soldiers are reported to have traded their army uniforms for civil police garb and have taken on a number of civilian occupations, including work as taxi drivers and telephone operators to keep better track of potential pro-independence activists in the population. As a *New York Times* reporter noted from El Aaiún in February 1992, "In truth, surveillance is so intense that it is hard to know what the 100,000 or so people in this desert outpost really think about the referendum."

Demonstrations by Sahrawi youths in the fall of 1991 were brutally repressed. One UN observer force member, who had also served in Latin America and Asia, told a *Washington Post* reporter in March 1992 that Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara was "the worst police state I have ever seen." Meanwhile, Morocco has reportedly made Sahrawi political prisoners declare their loyalty to the king and a Moroccan Sahara before granting them amnesty (under the peace agreement Morocco is to release all political prisoners). According to Amnesty International, when the Moroccan government released 300 Sahrawi detainees in a general amnesty in June 1991, it reported that 43 had died in custody and that hundreds more were still unaccounted for.

Within months of the cease-fire, tens of thousands of additional Moroccans arrived in the territory, complete with tents, food, and water provided by the Moroccan authorities. Before receiving their

supplies, however, Moroccan officials had the new arrivals photographed, inscribed their names on lists, and gave them voter-registration forms so they could participate in the referendum.

Other problems involve the United Nations team itself, which was charged in an early 1992 investigation by the London newspaper *The Independent* with mismanagement and an apparent pro-Moroccan tilt by some senior UN officials. The articles reported that UN officials sympathetic to Morocco had engaged in a number of questionable practices, including financial improprieties, that had stymied the peace process. Internal documents obtained by reporters revealed that UN personnel had passed on to Moroccan authorities confidential computer disks containing the names of individuals from the 1974 census rolls who had died, allowing Moroccan settlers to claim their identities. In addition there have been charges by

The Independent of widespread corruption in the MINURSO administration.

Because MINURSO is dominated by pro-Moroccan elements, it has failed to establish its authority on the Moroccan side and has refused to condemn or seek to stop repeated Moroccan violations of the cease-fire; this has left the Polisario with the burden of keeping the peace process on track. So serious were the logistical handicaps facing MINURSO peacekeeping forces that they all but ended their cease-fire monitoring in the summer of 1992. Hundreds of cease-fire violations were reported up

to that point, 95 percent of which were blamed on the Moroccans.

There have also been widespread reports of a pro-Moroccan bias by UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, a personal friend of King Hassan and one of the kingdom's few defenders in international forums when he was in the Egyptian foreign ministry. Several UN officials have resigned in protest.

DETERMINING WHO SHOULD VOTE

Moving the peace process forward in Western Sahara hinges on the issue of identifying eligible voters. In August 1991, UN special representative Johannes Manz reported that 70,204 people on the 1974 census list were still alive and eligible to vote. The next step in the UN's plan was to develop criteria for placing additional Sahrawis on the voter rolls who had been missed in the original Spanish

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census. Tribal leaders allied with both sides had been working to sort this out and distribute forms for those wanting inclusion. There are an estimated 170,000 refugees in Algeria, virtually all believed to be Sahrawis; 50,000 ethnic Sahrawis in Morocco and Mauritania; 30,000 inside Western Sahara; and sizable communities in the West.

Morocco, however, has insisted that the 1974 census is only the starting point for negotiations. It also argues that Sahrawis who fled to Morocco during the suppression of a 1958 rebellion against Spain (as well as their descendants) should be allowed to vote. And Morocco insists on including citizens who were members of any tribal group with historic ties to the territory.

Much to the dismay of the Polisario and many outside observers, the UN secretary general's office has agreed to many of Morocco's demands. Under guidelines favored by Boutros-Ghali, anyone who could demonstrate that he or she had lived in the territory for 6 years continuously or 12-years non-continuously, and anyone living in the territory who could demonstrate that he or she missed the census—as well as the children of all such people—would be eligible to vote in the referendum. This means tens of thousands of Moroccan citizens, virtually all of whom identify themselves as Moroccans, would have voting rights equal to those of native Sahrawis.

While this broader definition could also apply to pro-independence voters, those of Western Saharan background in Morocco (who generally favor incorporation) tend to be sedentary, while most others (who tend to support independence) are largely nomadic, making them difficult to locate. In addition, the Moroccan government has far more resources to organize its supporters.

As a concession to Morocco, the Polisario agreed to the secretary general's formula as long as two tribal elders—one pro-Moroccan and the other pro-independence—agreed that those claiming to fit the above categories were indeed eligible. However, Boutros-Ghali has now determined that just one elder's approval is sufficient, and he has effectively given Morocco the authority to name such an arbiter.

The result is that far more people from Morocco can be certified than from the refugee camps, where the majority of the Sahrawis living in Western Sahara at the time of the Moroccan invasion now reside. Using the secretary general's criteria, a nearly 2:1 ratio favors the Moroccans, thereby stacking the voter rolls in the kingdom's favor.

MORE OBSTACLES TO PEACE

The identification process finally began at the end of August 1994. However, the Moroccan-controlled media has denied MINURSO permission to purchase media advertising to inform the Sahrawi population of the opportunity to register to vote and take part in the identification process. And while it had been assumed that UN officers would take applications directly from would-be voters, MINURSO decided in 1993 to delegate this critical task to the Moroccans in the occupied Western Sahara and to the Polisario in the refugee camps in Algeria. The day before the identification was to begin, the Moroccans ordered MINURSO staff in El Aaiún to remove all United Nations insignia from the UN building where the identification was to take place. According to sworn testimony before Congress by Frank Ruddy, an American diplomat who served as deputy chairman of MINURSO, many pro-independence Sahrawis who filled out their applications at the Moroccan-run centers did not appear on the voter rolls and were thus disenfranchised. Even more problematic, the Moroccans allowed only Sahrawis cleared by the occupation authorities into the MINURSO identification centers, thus controlling who was identified. "We were unsuccessful in inviting Sahrawis to fill out voter applications at our centers. Nobody was allowed anywhere near us without Moroccan government approval," Ruddy said.

He also noted that Sahrawis who reported abuses to MINURSO officials "asked that our UN people keep an eye out for them after they left, in case they disappeared. Many said they were scared for their lives if the Moroccans saw them talking to UN people." Indeed, according to Ruddy, Moroccan security forces photographed and videotaped every Sahrawi who entered one identification center. More ominously, Ruddy also reported that Sahrawis were forced to turn in their receipts to Moroccan occupation forces as they left the identification centers, opening up "the very real possibility that the wrong people may be presenting receipts and getting voter cards."

As the identification process continued, Moroccan interference with MINURSO increased. Taps were discovered on all of MINURSO's local and international telephone lines, mail was tampered with, the rooms of MINURSO staff were regularly searched, and, according to Ruddy, the Moroccans "dictated even our work and flight schedules." In addition, Ruddy reported that in El Aaiún, "the Moroccans continue to treat the UN identification facilities as

their own." Ruddy has repeatedly faulted the secretary general's office for not forcefully responding to these abuses.

Meanwhile, the Security Council has begun to show signs of frustration at funding a peacekeeping operation that is not accomplishing anything. The United States is among a number of governments that have threatened to stop funding altogether, although critics charge that paltry funding is part of the problem.

At the same time, the Polisario is struggling with the effects of several defections in its leadership. As frustration has mounted over whether a peace settlement will ever take hold, generous—and often personally lucrative—offers of amnesty from Morocco have become all the more tempting. Moreover, Algeria, which had been the Polisario's primary military and economic backer, has been caught in bloody civil unrest in recent years. The Polisario has been left with the hope that principles of international law will win out over realpolitik.

Given that the status quo favors Morocco, the kingdom has every reason to delay the peace process at every turn. While it would be politically problematic to pull out of the process, Morocco clearly hopes that in the face of a protracted stalemate, the UN will give up on an interminable and costly process; it also hopes to wear down the Polisario. Even if elections were allowed to proceed, it is doubtful that the vote would be fair.

INTERNATIONAL REACTION

The international community's reaction to the stalling of the peace process has been mixed. The European Union has expressed concern at Morocco's postponement of the referendum and its proposed changes to the electoral registry, which "are incompatible with the principles and procedures laid down in the peace plan"; it has implied that it was willing to impose sanctions if Morocco continued its noncompliance. The EU has also frozen some agreements with Morocco until the referendum takes place and has called for outside observers to monitor the vote. In addition, European countries—faced with the challenges of Islamic radicalism in North Africa—increasingly see Morocco as a strategic partner that can help counter this perceived threat.

At the same time, the Security Council has not

pressed the secretary general to crack down on Moroccan violations. The problem, according to one senior UN diplomat, is that "no one wants to push Morocco." And with King Hassan's free-market economic reforms, crackdown on drug traffickers, and perceived role as a bulwark against Islamic extremism, Morocco's standing has increased still further.

As for the United States, a return in American policy to the strong pro-Moroccan position of the Reagan administration has become apparent since President Bill Clinton assumed office. The Clinton administration appears to have taken a position well to the right of its immediate predecessor. Ruddy has described how Marc Ginsberg, the United States ambassador to Morocco, implied in 1994 that there had indeed been a conscious shift by Clinton in favor of permanent Moroccan control over Western Sahara, a change from the Bush administration's readiness to recognize an independent Western Sahara.

In early December 1995, citing the reluctance of some UN members to continue funding the peacekeeping forces for a moribund peace process, Boutros-Ghali announced over Polisario objections that he supported moving ahead with a referendum based largely on Moroccan terms. The United States and France cosponsored a resolution to this effect. At the last minute, however, strenuous objections by Algeria, South Africa, and other countries, as well as a Polisario threat to return to war, led to its indefinite postponement. On January 31, the Security Council agreed to renew the peacekeeping force for another six months.

The peace plan for Western Sahara has real structural limitations, such as the many ambiguities regarding voter eligibility criteria. Despite such problems, the peace plan is reasonable and workable in itself, but requires the sustained interest of the United States and other powers to ensure its implementation. Yet there is a strong sense among UN personnel that Boutros-Ghali is letting the process die through his unwillingness to challenge Moroccan delays and abuses.

This concern is heightened by the possibility that a referendum biased in favor of Morocco would lead to rejection of the results, resulting in resumption of the war and irreparable damage to the credibility of the UN.

[T]he peace plan... requires the sustained interest of the United States and other powers to ensure its implementation.

TIME ON MOROCCO'S SIDE

The Polisario is outmatched militarily and continues to be overly dependent on Algeria, which is far too distracted by its internal crises to muster effective leadership. The flow of arms from Algeria, already reduced, has essentially been halted since the cease-fire. By contrast, Morocco has far more freedom of action, given its usefulness to France, the United States, and the Gulf monarchies. In addition, the stakes for Morocco are much higher and popular support for the cause is much greater than in Algeria. Indeed, there is an assumption in diplomatic circles in Rabat that King Hassan would lose his throne if he lost the referendum.

In short, a fair referendum is based on the premise of a more balanced power relationship than actually exists. This phenomenon goes beyond just Algeria's troubles. Morocco's successes at derailing the agreement and the failure of the Polisario's calls for rigorous enforcement of the agreement can be attributed in part to the changing international balance. The fall of communism and the international debt crisis have significantly reduced the political leverage of nonaligned third world countries in the UN, and it is these countries that have traditionally been the strongest supporters of the Polisario and Sahrawi self-determination. But the Polisario's recent efforts at internal democratization and its embrace of a pro-Western and free market orientation have apparently not improved its standing with the United States. And

the United States, which has been far more tolerant and sometimes openly supportive of Morocco and its irredentist designs, also now has far more clout in the UN and other international forums.

Though most independent observers believe that a fair vote would still favor independence, the political balance is decisively in Morocco's favor. The international community is focused on the demanding problems of Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Tom Porteus, writing in the June 28, 1991, *Middle East International*, stated that "this leaves the Moroccan monarch, who simply cannot afford to lose the referendum, with a free hand to ensure that it goes his way." Indeed, it appears that King Hassan has not significantly altered the position he has held since 1981—to give verbal support for the referendum while indefinitely delaying its implementation. And the Security Council's failure to invoke Article 25 of the UN charter, which would make UN decisions binding on Morocco, has made prospects for the successful implementation of the peace plan highly unlikely.

Supporters of Sahrawi self-determination and the peace plan assumed that in accepting the plan, King Hassan had backed himself into a corner. It now appears that the UN and other powers—including the United States—are letting him wriggle free. UN officials admit it may be years before the situation is resolved. Time appears to be on the side of the Moroccan occupation. ■

BOOK REVIEWS

ON AFRICA

The Seed is Mine: The Life of Kas Maine, a South African Sharecropper, 1894-1985

By Charles Van Onselen. New York: Hill and Wang, 1996. 649 pp., \$35.

Heart of Whiteness: Afrikaners Face Black Rule in the New South Africa

By June Goodwin and Ben Schiff. New York: Scribner, 1995. 414 pp., \$27.50.

South Africa is, by most accounts, a huge success story, overflowing with hope and promise. But societal transformation often lags behind political change. Are race relations part of the postapartheid success story? Both Van Onselen and Goodwin and Schiff rely on testimonial evidence to better understand the often misunderstood relationship between black and white South Africans.

When Kas Maine died, he willed his son his tools and farming equipment. A sharecropper for almost a century, Kas Maine had, as Van Onselen notes in a particularly touching and ironic moment, "given him everything and nothing. Had it not always been so?" *The Seed is Mine* is a massive undertaking that records the life of a black South African man, dignified, repressed, resourceful, and yes, ordinary. Van Onselen guides us carefully and often methodically through Maine's ancestry and his time on some 24 farms, using years of interviews and records to reconstruct and illuminate Kas Maine's transition from successful sharecropper to near-destitute victim of nearly 40 years of institutional apartheid. Van Onselen allows Maine's story to unfold, sometimes slowly but always eloquently and respectfully.

Although similar in method and purpose, Van Onselen's reserved authorial voice stands in contrast to Goodwin and Schiff's comprehensive look at Afrikaner culture in the aptly named *Heart of Whiteness*. Where Van Onselen's epic is a work of detail and method, meant to inspire, through its clarity of language, an understanding of man in his world, Schiff and Goodwin's interviews ask ordinary people extraordinary questions in their attempt to glean general fears, beliefs, and hopes from the Afrikaner people. Their insight into the minds of the Afrikaners is probing, fascinating, and invaluable to any student of Afrikaner religion, nationalism, or politics. But they seem a bit

too committed to the use of personal commentary with occasional and somewhat condescending reminders of the way we should react to the often unflattering words and sometimes inhumane deeds of the Afrikaners. Author imposition can often be helpful as a directorial tool; in a collection that relies as heavily on interview as *Heart of Whiteness* does, more subtle direction might have better benefited the narrative.

In the end, both Kas Maine's story and *Heart of Whiteness* achieve new heights of respect for black and white South African culture. Van Onselen says that the "troubled relationship of black and white South Africans cannot be fully understood by focusing on what tore them apart and ignoring what held them together. The history of a marriage, even an unhappy one, is inscribed in the wedding bands as well as the divorce notice." Goodwin and Schiff, by the very nature of their work, would have to agree. They are more predictive in their outlook—they are a writer and a political scientist, while Van Onselen is clearly dedicated to the power of oral history as a sufficient and independent means of storytelling—but their works are sure to be shelved side by side as two original views on South African history and culture that take into account not only the divisive nature of the former peculiar state but also the cohesiveness and the tolerance that just may allow the newly born state to remain viable.

Claudia Burke

The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide

By Gérard Prunier. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. 389 pp., \$29.95.

On April 6, 1994, a plane carrying Presidents Agathe Habyarimana of Rwanda and Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi was destroyed by a missile as it tried to land at Kigali airport. Within hours the killing started. As French researcher Gérard Prunier observes in this groundbreaking study, "Rwanda had fallen off the cliff." In weeks 800,000 dead would lay at the bottom. Mostly minority Tutsi and pro-democracy Hutu, they were butchered by machete in churches, burned to death in schools, or shot by the roadside. The killers were the majority Hutu. Though the slaughter was planned by government officials and begun

by loosely organized militiamen, most of the murderers were ordinary peasants. Fueled by ideology, greed, jealousy, and fear, they killed 11 percent of their countrymen in three months.

Prunier has written a fine history, an insightful analysis, and a damning critique. His thorough, readable narrative of the genocide and its origins shows how France, Rwanda's patron, and the UN, the country's putative peacekeeper, ignored repeated warning signs and, when the blood started to flow, wrung their hands. Though both knew of Hutu plans for a "final solution," the UN took no preventive action and the French lavishly supported the Hutus, even arming them for several weeks after they began killing. When they—and the rest of the world—finally recognized the Tutsis as victims, the effort was too little, too late.

The book also punctures the West's media-created myths about Rwanda. It demonstrates that the genocide was not an ethnic "civil war"—since 1991 the Habyarimana government had been creating "enemy lists" of Tutsis and moderate Hutus. Nor was the violence an unavoidable consequence of ethnic hatred—the Hutu and Tutsi "ethnicities" were originally social classes (German and Belgian colonialists fabricated the racial distinction and encouraged animosity to disunify their subjects).

Perhaps Prunier's greatest contribution is his ability to analyze the genocide as both a scientist and a humanitarian. The scholar who can convincingly weave personal accounts into sociopolitical analysis is a rarity. Prunier does this best in a section called "The Genocide," in which he explains the larger nature of the slaughter without losing sight of the horrific personal suffering it engendered.

Prunier concludes that Rwanda needs "justice and cash—in that order"—to prevent another round of death. Given the cynical behavior of the West in the latest round, he is not hopeful.

Michael Brus

Losing Mogadishu:

Testing U.S. Policy in Somalia

By Jonathan Stevenson. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995. 208 pp., \$24.95.

Like all writers, journalists are as concerned with how they say something as they are with what they say. They too can be seduced by the sound and the inexorable pull of language and allow metaphor, meant to reveal the deeper truth, to instead obscure and create a picture that captures the writer's skill—but not reality.

Jonathan Stevenson, a lawyer turned reporter, falls prey to this seduction in *Losing Mogadishu*. He avoids the excesses found in the writing of fellow journalist Robert Kaplan (there are no cabinet ministers with eyes like "egg yolks" suffused with an "irrefutable sadness"), but he is equally adept at the well-turned phrase that says less than meets the ear. Thus, in describing the superpower flip-flop that saw the Soviet Union drop Somalia as a client and the United States embrace it, Stevenson tells us that "Jimmy Carter had just taken over the White House with a mandate for a nonimperial presidency that necessarily enervated executive power at its constitutional synapse—namely, foreign policy." We also learn that the "Somalia mindset is indeed baleful machismo bootstrapped from attitude into ethic."

Stylistics aside, the last comment captures an unsettling attitude. A relative newcomer to the region, Stevenson offers pithy pronouncements on Somalia in an authoritative voice that resonates with colonial condescension. For Stevenson, the Somali people are "by inclination gregarious—a trait that adds to their seductiveness and therefore their cunning." They "prefer killing to maiming. Calculation sums up character." There is more: "They were not used to rationalist learning, much less to taking instruction from benevolent masters, having only had a written language since 1973." "[Thus the] Somalis were simply doing what was inbred. . . and lacked the moral frame of reference necessary for wholesale reform."

What is one to make of these Kurtz-like observations? (In the book's acknowledgments, Stevenson thanks Matthew Bryden—who has contributed to *Current History*—"for teaching me about one-tenth of what he knows about the Somali people." It is unfortunate that Stevenson never learned the other nine-tenths.) Are they an example of the "cultural peculiarities" that American "military personnel from general to private should be thoroughly and topically briefed on" in order to avoid another ill-fated intervention like that in Somalia?

The answer seems to be yes. Stevenson, who covered Somalia for *Newsweek*, the *Economist*, and the London *Sunday Times*, believes that the United States got Somalia wrong; *Losing Mogadishu* is intended as a prescriptive postmortem of an operation that was a failure both in conception and execution. Stevenson, however, is unable to carry out his self-assigned task; his narrative flounders amid the sieved history, the colorful anecdote, and,

especially in the concluding chapters on how to avoid future Somalias, the boldly stated banality ("Let Soldiers Be Soldiers"; "Know Your Enemy").

This, like the crass generalizations about the Somali people, is unfortunate, since Stevenson does provide strong reporting on the political and military games warlord Aidid, the United States, and the United Nations played, but it is not enough to rescue *Losing Mogadishu* from its defects.

William W. Finan, Jr.

Networks of Dissolution: Somalia Undone

By Anna Simons. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1996. 246 pp., \$55, cloth; \$19.95, paper.

Simons, an assistant professor of anthropology at UCLA, offers an antidote to the Somaliawfulization encountered in Stevenson's *Losing Mogadishu*. Here the Somali people exist as individuals, not as "opportunists incapable of a functioning state."

Networks of Dissolution argues that "Somalia came undone thanks to a conjunction of events, institutions, and individuals." As with many other third world states that failed with the end of the superpower competition and the patron-client ties it nourished, the proximate cause of Somalia's dissolution, according to Simons, "would seem to have emerged from competition over the control of resources." For Westerners, the Somali state's breakdown because of this competition meant that chaos reigned. Simons notes, however, that "although it may have looked on the surface as though there was confusion—and anarchy—that did not mean there was no structure to what was occurring." Simons' book struggles to present a lucid exposition of this structure, but it is bogged down by the organizational remnants of the doctoral dissertation from which it evidently originated. W. W. F. ■

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THE MONTH IN REVIEW

March 1996

INTERNATIONAL

Middle East Peace Process

March 4—Talks between Israeli and Syrian negotiators are suspended after today's suicide bombing that killed 12 people in Tel Aviv; Israeli officials say the continued presence of Islamic Jihad and Hamas headquarters in Damascus is "not conducive to a constructive environment" for negotiations.

March 13—In the Egyptian city of Sharm el-Sheik, the leaders of 27 nations, including the United States, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority, pledge to cooperate against terrorism; Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Sudan were not invited, and Syria and Lebanon declined to attend.

March 29—In Washington, D.C., political leaders and intelligence officials from 29 countries and organizations, including Israel and the Palestinian Authority, meet at the State Department to draft resolutions aimed at fighting terrorism; the recommendations are to be presented at a meeting in Luxembourg on April 22.

United Nations

March 7—After a 2-month review, the Security Council votes to extend economic sanctions against Iraq.

March 18—The 2d round of UN-Iraqi talks on a proposed limited sale of Iraqi oil ends in stalemate over a provision requiring Iraq to share a portion of the profits with Iraqi Kurds; a 3d round of talks is scheduled for April 8.

AFGHANISTAN

March 24—Shelling by Taliban militia kills 18 civilians and wounds 14 in Kabul; yesterday 40 Taliban fighters were killed and 20 wounded when the government bombed their positions; 7 civilians were reported injured in the government attack.

AUSTRALIA

March 2—The conservative Liberal Party wins today's parliamentary elections, ousting the Labor Party, which has been in power for 13 years; Liberal Party head John Howard, a former finance minister, will be named prime minister.

BAHRAIN

March 26—The execution of Isa Qambar, a dissident convicted of killing a police officer in 1995, leads to fighting between protestors and police in the city of Manama; Qambar's execution is the 1st to occur in Bahrain in 20 years.

BANGLADESH

March 3—Prime Minister Khaleda Zia offers to step down to allow a nonparty government to conduct new elections; the opposition says the February 15 elections were conducted fraudulently.

March 27—Responding to the protests, Prime Minister Zia asks President Abdur Rahman Biswas to form a caretaker government until new elections can be held; Zia does not resign.

March 30—President Abdur Rahman Biswas dissolves parliament and sets up an interim government that will be headed by former Chief Justice Habibur Rahman.

BELARUS

March 24—Approximately 15,000 people march in Minsk to protest a joint Russian-Belarusian plan announced yesterday to form a "union state" between the 2 countries.

March 30—The IMF decides not to release the remaining \$230 million of a \$300 million loan it approved for Belarus in 1995 after concluding that Belarus displays "no political will to continue market-oriented stabilization and structural reforms."

BENIN

March 19—Unofficial results from yesterday's runoff presidential election indicate that Mathieu Kérékou, a Marxist who ruled the country until 1990 after coming to power in a coup in 1972, has won 59 percent of the vote; incumbent President Nicéphore Soglo receives 41 percent.

BOLIVIA

March 27—In La Paz, an estimated 30,000 people take part in protests in support of a 2-week-old strike by government workers for wage increases and the elimination of a government plan to sell state-owned industries; hundreds of people were detained during last week's protests, in which 1 person was reported killed by police.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

March 1—At The Hague, the UN War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia indicts Bosnian Serb General Djordje Djukic; the crimes he is charged with include the shelling of Sarajevo.

March 18—Serbian President Slobodan Milosovic, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, and acting Bosnian President Ejup Ganic meet in Geneva to officially reaffirm their commitment to the November 20 Dayton peace accords.

March 22—The UN War Crimes Tribunal charges 3 Bosnian Muslims and 1 Bosnian Croat with the murder, torture, and rape of Serb prisoners at a detention camp in 1992; these are the 1st Bosnian Muslims to be charged by the tribunal.

March 29—Bosnian Serbs attack Muslim-Croat Federation police officers with grenades after the officers try to arrest 4 Bosnian Serb youths thought to be looting homes on the Federation side of the Sarajevo suburb of Grbavica, which was recently transferred from Bosnian Serb control; no one was hurt in the attack.

CANADA

March 13—The government announces that it has lodged a trade protest with the US government in accordance with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) over US legislation aimed at pressuring other countries to stop doing business with Cuba; Mexico has requested inclusion in any US-Canadian discussions of the issue.

CHINA

- March 8—The military begins a series of missile tests off the northern and southern coasts of Taiwan; the island's 1st free presidential elections are scheduled for March 23.
- March 24—The government calls for an official meeting between President Jiang Zemin and newly elected Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui.
- March 25—A government-appointed committee votes to replace Hong Kong's democratically elected legislature with an appointed council after China takes over the British colony next year.

COLOMBIA

- March 5—José Santacruz Londoño, a member of the Cali drug cartel, is killed by police outside Medellín; on March 1 the US cited Londoño's escape from prison as 1 of the reasons it was officially declaring that Colombia was not cooperating to fight drugs; under this "decertification" Colombia is ineligible for any US aid other than that linked to fighting drug trafficking.
- March 11—General Camilo Zúñiga, the commander of the military, resigns; Zúñiga, who American officials suspect of having ties to drug traffickers, is replaced by Admiral Holdan Delgado Villamil, a naval commander who directed an anti-drug-smuggling operation in the Caribbean.

CROATIA

- March 30—Government officials announce that a senior Bosnian Croat military officer, General Tihomir Blaskic, who has been charged by the UN War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, will turn himself in to the tribunal.

CUBA

- March 16—The Washington Post reports that the Cuban government has dropped its claim that the February 24 downing of 2 Cuban-American-piloted planes occurred over its territorial waters after CIA officials showed proof to Cuban intelligence officials at a meeting in New York that the planes were shot down over international waters.

GERMANY

- March 9—A pro-Chechen Turkish hijacker who diverted a Turkish airline flight to Munich yesterday surrenders to German authorities after an 11-hour standoff; the 101 passengers and 8 crew members aboard the airliner are released unharmed.
- March 17—Nearly 2,000 Kurdish protesters stage a violent protest in Dortmund; leaders of the protest, thought to belong to the Turkish Kurdish Workers Party, were angered by a German court ruling barring a public celebration of the Kurdish New Year; there are 2 million Turks living in Germany, nearly 500,000 of whom are Kurds.

INDIA

- March 24—In Kashmir, at least 3 people are killed in fighting between government troops and guerrillas of the Jammu-Kashmir Liberation Front, which is demanding a separate Kashmiri state or union with Pakistan.
- March 30—Troops destroy a Kashmir mosque in Srinagar that served as headquarters for the Kashmir guerrillas; at least 16 militants are killed.

IRAN

- March 22—Ayatollah Mohammed Yazdi, the country's chief judge, threatens retaliation against Germany if a March 15 warrant issued by a German judge for the arrest of Iranian

Intelligence Minister Ali Fallahiyan on murder charges is not rescinded.

IRAQ

- March 10—UN arms inspectors make 2 surprise inspections of sites they believe contain information about Iraqi attempts to develop weapons of mass destruction; the inspections follow a March 9 attempt to gain access to documents at the Irrigation Ministry that was initially delayed by Iraqi authorities.
- March 21—Jordanian officials report that Iraqi General Nizar al-Khazraji, a former Iraqi army chief of staff and the head of Iraq's armed forces during the last 3 years of the Iran-Iraq war, has defected to Jordan.

ISRAEL

- March 2—The army announces the arrest of 5 of 7 Palestinians it believes were en route to a planned Hamas-sponsored terrorist attack on a Jewish settlement in the Gaza Strip.
- March 3—A suicide bomb attack on a bus in Jerusalem kills 18 people and the suicide bomber, and wounds 10 others; the attack breaks the 8-day suspension of terrorism in Israel declared by Hamas to allow Israel to consider the group's terms for a cease-fire after 2 similar attacks on February 25 that killed 26 people; the Hamas offshoot group taking responsibility for this attack declares a 3-month moratorium on terrorism to allow the negotiation of a Palestinian Authority-mediated truce.
- March 4—In Tel Aviv, 11 people and a suicide bomber are killed and 126 are wounded in a bombing outside a shopping mall; an anonymous caller claims that Islamic Jihad is responsible. The government announces that it will limit movement of Palestinians within the West Bank and further restrict their employment by Israelis.
- March 6—A Palestinian, Muhammed Abu Warda, says in a television interview that the recent series of bomb attacks in Israel was aimed at influencing the outcome of the May 29 elections and thwarting the peace process; Abu Warda was arrested by Palestinian police on March 3 and sentenced to life in prison on March 5 by a Palestinian court for his involvement in recruiting 3 of the most recent suicide bombers.
- March 8—In the West Bank village of Burka, Israeli soldiers dynamite the home of Rayid Shanoubi, the suicide bomber whose March 3 attack killed 18 people and himself; Israeli and Palestinian authorities continue to conduct raids against Hamas-backed educational and charitable institutions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
- March 13—Israeli officials permit trucks bearing essential food supplies into the Gaza Strip and reestablish communication with Palestinian officials. The Israeli government imposed a total closure its borders with the West Bank and Gaza and a ban on all movement within the 2 territories after the March 4 terrorist bombing in Tel Aviv.
- March 15—The government requests additional US assistance for Israeli antiterrorism efforts; on March 14 President Bill Clinton promised \$100 million in equipment and training to assist the Israeli counterterrorist effort, including the building of a high-tech barrier that will seal off the West Bank and Gaza Strip along the 1967 demarcation line.
- March 27—Yigal Amir is sentenced to life in prison after he is convicted of murder for the November 4 assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.

JAPAN

- March 7—A court in Okinawa convicts 3 American soldiers of abducting and raping a 12-year-old Okinawan girl; 2 of the men are sentenced to 7 years in prison, the 3d to 6 and a half years.

KOREA, SOUTH

March 11—Former Presidents Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo go on trial, charged with staging a coup in 1979 and ordering the massacre of pro-democracy protesters in Kwangju in 1980; both men are also being tried separately on corruption charges.

LEBANON

March 10—Party of God guerrillas launch attacks against Israeli troops in Israel's self-declared security zone in southern Lebanon; 1 Israeli soldier is reported killed and 5 are wounded; Israeli forces shell suspected guerrilla camps in villages near the Israeli-occupied zone in retaliation.
 March 13—An appeals court releases 2 men convicted of the 1976 deaths of 2 American diplomats and their driver; the decision comes after the court ruled that the 2 men were covered under a 1990 amnesty for politically motivated crimes.
 March 20—A Party of God suicide bomber kills 1 Israeli soldier and injures 7 others and 1 Israeli civilian when he blows himself up near an Israeli convoy in southern Lebanon.
 March 30—Israeli shelling in southern Lebanon kills 2 Lebanese civilians; Islamic militants respond with rocket attacks.

LIBYA

March 27—Three Saudi Arabian hijackers surrender to authorities after forcing an Egyptian jetliner to land in Libya; no one is injured in the incident.

MEXICO

March 6—In Union County, New Jersey, former Deputy Attorney General Mario Ruiz Massieu is released from a jail to house arrest in the same state; Ruiz Massieu has been detained in the US since March 3, 1995, after he failed to declare \$40,000 in cash to customs agents; 4 US attempts to extradite him to Mexico for trial on charges of political cover-up in the investigation of his brother's murder have failed after judges deemed the Mexican officials' evidence insufficient or derived from testimony obtained through torture.
 March 12—Guerrero state Governor Rubén Figueroa Alcocer resigns; Figueroa, a prominent member of the Institutional Revolutionary Party, has been accused by opposition parties of inciting and then helping to cover up the killings of 17 dissident peasants on a rural road in Guerrero last year.

PAKISTAN

March 3—Indian and Pakistani troops exchange fire across the Kashmir border; no one is injured.

PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY

March 7—The first meeting of the 88-member Palestinian Council is convened in Gaza by President Yasir Arafat.
 March 8—Palestinian police detain Mahmoud al-Zahhar, the political leader of Hamas, after he criticized the arrest of militants earlier this week; the Palestinian Authority recently conducted a series of raids on Hamas-backed institutions, and on March 6 took control of all mosques in the areas under the Authority's jurisdiction.
 March 9—CIA officials meet with Arafat near the Israeli border to discuss antiterrorism measures and demand the arrest of 5 Hamas military leaders believed to be involved in the recent series of anti-Israeli suicide bombings; over the past week the Palestinian Authority has arrested 600 suspected militants in the Gaza Strip.
 March 10—The Palestinian Authority announces the arrest of 3 senior Hamas military leaders.

March 21—Islamic militants formerly affiliated with Hamas form a new political party, the Islamic National Salvation Party, that rejects the use of violence.

RUSSIA

March 3—In Chechnya, the Russian military reports fighting today with rebels in the western village of Sernovodsk after separatist leaders failed to attend talks aimed at disarming the rebels.
 March 5—Approximately 1,000 people flee Sernovodsk as fighting between Russian forces and Chechen separatists continues; the Russian Tass news agency estimates that as many as 16,000 people have fled the town over the past several days to take refuge in the neighboring Ingushetia republic.
 March 6—Several hundred Chechen rebels enter the Chechen capital of Grozny; until today's battle Russian forces had held the city for more than a year.
 March 11—Fighting between separatist rebels and Russian troops continues in Grozny; 100 civilians have been reported killed, along with 170 Russian soldiers and 300 rebels; hundreds of combatants on both sides have been reported wounded.
 March 13—Russian forces begin air strikes against the western Chechen village of Bamut, a rebel stronghold where Chechen separatists say they are holding approximately 90 hostages seized during last week's attack on Grozny.
 President Boris Yeltsin issues a decree permitting the sale and purchase of land for the 1st time since the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution.
 March 15—Parliament votes 250 to 98 in favor of a resolution denouncing the 1991 accord that dissolved the Soviet Union; the resolution has no legal significance.
 March 16—The government reports that its troops in Grozny are "mopping up" after the latest round of fighting; the government denies that rebels are holding 90 Russian soldiers captive in Bamut.
 March 22—Russian forces conduct air strikes throughout Chechnya; heavy casualties are reported on both sides.
 March 26—The IMF announces its approval of a \$10.2 billion loan to Russia.
 March 29—Yeltsin signs agreements to establish closer ties with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Belarus.
 March 31—In a nationally broadcast speech, Yeltsin announces the immediate cessation of major military operations in Chechnya; he also says he will approve peace talks with Chechen rebel leader General Dzhokhar Dudayev and that Chechnya will be granted freedoms greater than those given the other Russian republics. At least 30,000 people have been killed in the 15-month conflict.

RWANDA

March 12—The government asks Cameroon to extradite former Colonel Theoneste Bagosora; he is accused of having helped plan the killing of at least half a million Tutsi and Hutu in 1994.
 March 31—Foreign Minister Anastase Gasana announces that the government of Cameroon has arrested 11 Rwandans accused of taking part in the 1994 mass killings.

SERBIA

March 9—At least 20,000 people demonstrate in Belgrade against the government of President Slobodan Milosovic on the anniversary of opposition protests that were crushed by troops in 1991.

SINGAPORE

March 25—Former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew files a libel suit

against American educator Christopher Lingle over Lingle's 1994 article in the *International Herald Tribune* that implied that there was corruption in Singapore's government. The newspaper has already awarded Lee \$210,000 in damages as the result of an earlier suit.

SOUTH AFRICA

March 11—Former Defense Minister Magnus Malan's trial begins; he and 19 codefendants are being tried for murder in connection with a 1987 raid on the home of an African National Congress activist that left 13 people dead.

March 19—President Nelson Mandela is granted a divorce from his wife, Winnie.

SRI LANKA

March 23—Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam guerrillas kill 24 soldiers and wound 14 in an attack on an army base.

March 31—Tamil Tigers sink a navy boat off the northeastern coast, killing 10 sailors.

SWEDEN

March 21—Parliament elects Social Democratic Party leader Göran Persson prime minister.

TAIWAN

March 23—President Lee Teng-hui of the ruling Nationalist Party wins the presidential election with 54% of the vote.

TURKEY

March 3—Prime Minister Tansu Ciller's True Path Party and the head of the Motherland Party, Mesut Yilmaz, agree to form a center-right coalition to keep the Islamic Welfare Party from power; the 2 parties trailed the Welfare Party in last December's elections.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

March 5—An immigration appeals judge orders that Saudi Arabian dissident Mohammed al-Massari's request for asylum be reconsidered; Massari was denied asylum in January.

March 9—Police suspect the Irish Republican Army (IRA) is responsible for a bombing today in London; no one is injured.

March 27—The European Union bans exports to any country of British beef or any export made with British beef by-product; an unknown amount of British beef is thought to be infected with an encephalopathic disease that is harmful to human beings.

Northern Ireland

March 16—A member of an IRA splinter group kills a young girl and wounds a 19-year-old boy in Belfast.

UNITED STATES

March 6—The Defense Department deploys 34 Air Force planes to Jordan as part of what it calls an "air power expeditionary force" to maintain the US air presence over the "no-fly" zone in southern Iraq until the departing *Nimitz* aircraft carrier's replacement, the *Carl Vinson*, arrives in July.

The Clinton administration releases the US annual human rights report in which China is criticized for conducting "widespread and well-documented human rights abuses"; the report notes human rights abuses by Russia in the war in

Chechnya, by Egypt in its crackdown against Islamic militants, as well as a continuing pattern of abuse in Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Colombia, Indonesia, North Korea, and Sudan; it says abuses have decreased in Turkey and Israel.

March 7—Congress passes a measure to extend the government's borrowing authority through March 29; without the measure the US would have been forced to default on the federal debt. White House and congressional leaders have been unable to reach agreement on a federal budget for 1996, which resulted in 2 government shutdowns earlier this year; temporary congressional provisions that allow the government to continue functioning will expire March 20.

March 11—The State Department announces its denial of a visa to Markus Wolf, the former communist East German deputy minister of state security, because of his former involvement in terrorist activities; Wolf denies any terrorist involvement and says he will appeal the decision.

March 14—President Bill Clinton visits Israel and pledges \$100 million for training and technical assistance for Israeli antiterrorism efforts.

March 20—Congress announces that the US will deliver military hardware worth \$368 million to Pakistan; the hardware, which Pakistan has paid for, has gone undelivered under a 1990 law prohibiting sales of military material to Pakistan because of its nuclear program.

The administration approves a Taiwanese request to buy military equipment that includes electronic warfare devices and air defense missiles; the approval comes amid heightened tensions with China over the military maneuvers it is holding near Taiwan.

March 23—Officials investigating the 1990 killing of American Michael Devine in Guatemala conclude that the circumstances behind his death were covered up by 2 Guatemalan presidents, 2 Guatemalan defense ministers, and senior military officials on the CIA payroll; the investigators are also opening an inquiry into new allegations from the Guatemalan armed forces that the murder of Efraín Bámaca, a Guatemalan guerrilla married to an American citizen, was undertaken with the involvement of high-ranking Guatemalan military and intelligence officials.

March 27—A federal judge denies Panamanian General Manuel Antonio Noriega a new trial on the grounds that new evidence of paid testimony by a key witness, while "troubling," would nonetheless have been insufficient to have affected the outcome of Noriega's 1992 trial, in which he was convicted of 8 counts of drug trafficking, money laundering, and racketeering and sentenced to 40 years in prison.

March 29—Congress approves a temporary measure to fund government agencies through April 24; congressional and administrative leaders remain deadlocked over the approval of a federal budget for the 1995–1996 fiscal year.

ZAIRE

March 7—UN officials report that government troops withdrew from refugee camps in eastern Zaire in late February because they had not been paid; earlier in the month the troops had surrounded the camps to pressure the refugees to return to Rwanda.

ZIMBABWE

March 17—President Robert Mugabe wins reelection; the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front leader ran unopposed after 2 opposition candidates withdrew in protest just before the election; Mugabe has been in power since 1980. ■



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